From: Ahmed S. Darwish Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2008 23:59:43 +0000 (+1000) Subject: Audit: Final renamings and cleanup X-Git-Tag: v2.6.26-rc1~1137^2~2 X-Git-Url: https://err.no/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=04305e4aff8b0533dc05f9f6f1a34d0796bd985f;p=linux-2.6 Audit: Final renamings and cleanup Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish Acked-by: James Morris --- diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 04869c9601..4ccb048cae 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ struct audit_field { u32 type; u32 val; u32 op; - char *se_str; - void *se_rule; + char *lsm_str; + void *lsm_rule; }; #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 7c69cb5e44..28fef6bf85 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) if (e->rule.fields) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; - kfree(f->se_str); - security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule); + kfree(f->lsm_str); + security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); } kfree(e->rule.fields); kfree(e->rule.filterkey); @@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; f->type = data->fields[i]; f->val = data->values[i]; - f->se_str = NULL; - f->se_rule = NULL; + f->lsm_str = NULL; + f->lsm_rule = NULL; switch(f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: case AUDIT_UID: @@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f->val; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->se_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, kfree(str); goto exit_free; } else - f->se_str = str; + f->lsm_str = str; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); @@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: data->buflen += data->values[i] = - audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str); + audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str); break; case AUDIT_WATCH: data->buflen += data->values[i] = @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str)) + if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str)) return 1; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: @@ -862,28 +862,28 @@ out: return new; } -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be * re-initialized. */ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, struct audit_field *sf) { int ret = 0; - char *se_str; + char *lsm_str; - /* our own copy of se_str */ - se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL); - if (unlikely(!se_str)) + /* our own copy of lsm_str */ + lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!lsm_str)) return -ENOMEM; - df->se_str = se_str; + df->lsm_str = lsm_str; - /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */ - ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str, - (void **)&df->se_rule); + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ + ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, + (void **)&df->lsm_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is " - "invalid\n", df->se_str); + "invalid\n", df->lsm_str); ret = 0; } @@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, new->tree = old->tree; memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount); - /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { switch (new->fields[i].type) { @@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ unlock_and_return: return result; } -/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules. +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index c0700535e5..56e56ed594 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -527,14 +527,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, match for now to avoid losing information that may be wanted. An error message will also be logged upon error */ - if (f->se_rule) { + if (f->lsm_rule) { if (need_sid) { security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, + f->lsm_rule, ctx); } break; @@ -545,18 +545,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR also applies here */ - if (f->se_rule) { + if (f->lsm_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { result = security_audit_rule_match( name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, ctx); + f->lsm_rule, ctx); } else if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { if (security_audit_rule_match( ctx->names[j].osid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, ctx)) { + f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, aux = aux->next) { if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; - if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) { + if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c8b9ef155 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks + * + * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which + * is released under below copyrights: + * + * Author: James Morris + * + * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris + * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H +#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure. + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operater the rule uses + * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule + * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * + * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure + * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with + * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed + * + * This will free all memory associated with the given rule. + * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed. + */ +void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule. + * @sid: the context ID to check + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operater the rule uses + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against + * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check + * + * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and + * -errno on failure. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule, + struct audit_context *actx); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields. + * @rule: rule to be checked + * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); + +#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */ +