]> err.no Git - linux-2.6/commit
keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tue, 29 Apr 2008 08:01:31 +0000 (01:01 -0700)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tue, 29 Apr 2008 15:06:17 +0000 (08:06 -0700)
commit69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9
tree3ff4ecae21c140a2beed25cfa9e55b788f9814ac
parent6b79ccb5144f9ffb4d4596c23e7570238dd12abc
keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed

Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
include/linux/key.h
kernel/user.c
security/keys/internal.h
security/keys/key.c
security/keys/keyring.c
security/keys/process_keys.c
security/selinux/hooks.c