* 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
* 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
*/
-#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
struct flowi *fl)
{
u32 state_sid;
- u32 pol_sid;
- int err;
+ int rc;
- if (xp->security) {
- if (!x->security)
- /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
- return 0;
- else
- state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
- pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
- } else
+ if (!xp->security)
if (x->security)
/* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
return 0;
else
/* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
return 1;
-
- err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
- NULL);
-
- if (err)
- return 0;
-
- err = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
- NULL)? 0:1;
-
- return err;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
- * can use a given security association.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
- struct xfrm_policy *xp)
-{
- int rc = 0;
- u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
-
- if (!xp->security)
- if (!xfrm->security)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
else
- if (!xfrm->security)
+ if (!x->security)
+ /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
return 0;
+ else
+ if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+ return 0;
- /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
- if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
- if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
- return 0;
+ state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
- sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- }
+ if (fl->secid != state_sid)
+ return 0;
- rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
NULL)? 0:1;
+ /*
+ * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
+ * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
+ * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
+ * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
+ */
+
return rc;
}
/*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
return -EINVAL;
- if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+ if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
- uctx->ctx_len,
+ str_len + 1,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
- ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+ ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
uctx+1,
- ctx->ctx_len);
+ str_len);
+ ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0;
rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
- ctx->ctx_len,
+ str_len,
&ctx->ctx_sid);
if (rc)
kfree(ctx);
}
-/*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
- * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
- * association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
- */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
- u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
- if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
- goto out;
-
- dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
- if (!dst)
- goto out;
-
- for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
- dst_test = dst_test->child) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
-
- if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- break;
- }
- }
- dst_release(dst);
-
-out:
- return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
- * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
- * type SCM_SECURITY.
- */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- struct sec_path *sp;
-
- if (skb == NULL)
- return SECSID_NULL;
-
- if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
- return SECSID_NULL;
-
- sp = skb->sp;
- if (sp) {
- int i;
-
- for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
- if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- return ctx->ctx_sid;
- }
- }
- }
-
- return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
/*
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
*/
}
}
+ /*
+ * This check even when there's no association involved is
+ * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+ * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+ * explicitly allowed by policy.
+ */
+
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
* If we have no security association, then we need to determine
* whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
* If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
- * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
if (dst) {
struct dst_entry *dst_test;
- for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+ for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL;
dst_test = dst_test->child) {
struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
}
}
+ switch (proto) {
+ case IPPROTO_AH:
+ case IPPROTO_ESP:
+ case IPPROTO_COMP:
+ /*
+ * We should have already seen this packet once before
+ * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
+ * unlabeled check.
+ */
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check even when there's no association involved is
+ * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+ * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+ * explicitly allowed by policy.
+ */
+
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
out: