#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
-#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#ifdef RPC_DEBUG
{
u8 *ptr;
u8 pad;
- int len = buf->len;
+ size_t len = buf->len;
if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) {
pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1);
} else
len -= buf->head[0].iov_len;
if (len <= buf->page_len) {
- int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
+ unsigned int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
>>PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
- int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
+ unsigned int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
& (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
- ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last], KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA);
+ ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last], KM_USER0);
pad = *(ptr + offset);
- kunmap_atomic(ptr, KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA);
+ kunmap_atomic(ptr, KM_USER0);
goto out;
} else
len -= buf->page_len;
return 0;
}
-static inline void
-make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize)
+static void
+make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen)
{
static u64 i = 0;
u64 *q = (u64 *)p;
* uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I
* don't care enough. */
- BUG_ON(blocksize != 8);
- *q = i++;
+ /* initialize to random value */
+ if (i == 0) {
+ i = random32();
+ i = (i << 32) | random32();
+ }
+
+ switch (conflen) {
+ case 16:
+ *q++ = i++;
+ /* fall through */
+ case 8:
+ *q++ = i++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
}
/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
{
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
- s32 checksum_type;
char cksumdata[16];
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
int blocksize = 0, plainlen;
- unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start;
+ unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start;
s32 now;
int headlen;
struct page **tmp_pages;
u32 seq_send;
- dprintk("RPC: gss_wrap_kerberos\n");
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_wrap_kerberos\n");
now = get_seconds();
- switch (kctx->signalg) {
- case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
- checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
- break;
- default:
- dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->signalg %d not"
- " supported\n", kctx->signalg);
- goto out_err;
- }
- if (kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE && kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) {
- dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->sealalg %d not supported\n",
- kctx->sealalg);
- goto out_err;
- }
-
blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize);
BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize);
plainlen = blocksize + buf->len - offset;
- headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen) -
+ headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, 24 + plainlen) -
(buf->len - offset);
ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
buf->len += headlen;
BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize);
- g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen, &ptr);
+ g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used,
+ GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + plainlen, &ptr);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG&0xff);
+ /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
+ ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff);
- /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
- krb5_hdr = ptr - 2;
- msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24;
- /* XXXJBF: */ BUG_ON(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset + headlen != msg_start + blocksize);
+ msg_start = ptr + 24;
- *(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(kctx->signalg);
- memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4);
- *(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 4) = htons(kctx->sealalg);
+ *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5);
+ memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4);
+ *(__be16 *)(ptr + 4) = htons(SEAL_ALG_DES);
make_confounder(msg_start, blocksize);
/* XXXJBF: UGH!: */
tmp_pages = buf->pages;
buf->pages = pages;
- if (make_checksum(checksum_type, krb5_hdr, 8, buf,
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf,
offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
buf->pages = tmp_pages;
- switch (kctx->signalg) {
- case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
- if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
- md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
- goto out_err;
- memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16,
- md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH,
- KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH);
-
- dprintk("RPC: make_seal_token: cksum data: \n");
- print_hexl((u32 *) (krb5_hdr + 16), KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH, 0);
- break;
- default:
- BUG();
- }
+ if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
+ md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8);
spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
seq_send = kctx->seq_send++;
/* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
* and encrypt at the same time: */
if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
- seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8)))
- goto out_err;
+ seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize,
pages))
- goto out_err;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- return ((kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE);
-out_err:
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
u32
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
int signalg;
int sealalg;
- s32 checksum_type;
char cksumdata[16];
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
s32 now;
s32 seqnum;
unsigned char *ptr;
int bodysize;
- u32 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
void *data_start, *orig_start;
int data_len;
int blocksize;
- dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
+ dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
buf->len - offset))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
- (*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) )
- goto out;
+ if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
+ (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff)))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
/* get the sign and seal algorithms */
- signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8);
- sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
-
- /* Sanity checks */
-
- if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
- goto out;
-
- if (sealalg == 0xffff)
- goto out;
-
- /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
- key type, so a simple comparison is ok */
-
- if (sealalg != kctx->sealalg)
- goto out;
+ signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
+ if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- /* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms,
- but few enough that we can try them all. */
+ sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
+ if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if ((kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
- (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
- (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
- signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD))
- goto out;
+ if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
- ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base))
- goto out;
+ ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base))
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- /* compute the checksum of the message */
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf,
+ ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- /* initialize the the cksum */
- switch (signalg) {
- case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
- checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
- break;
- default:
- ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
+ md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- switch (signalg) {
- case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
- ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf,
- ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
-
- ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
- md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
-
- if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) {
- ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- default:
- ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
now = get_seconds();
- ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
if (now > kctx->endtime)
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
/* do sequencing checks */
- ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
- if ((ret = krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
- &seqnum)))
- goto out;
+ if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8,
+ &direction, &seqnum))
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!kctx->initiate && direction != 0))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
/* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
* better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
- data_start = ptr + 22 + blocksize;
+ data_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + blocksize;
orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start;
memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len);
buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start);
buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start);
- ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize))
- goto out;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-out:
- return ret;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
projects / linux-2.6 / blobdiff