#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \
{ .proc_show = &proc_##OTYPE } )
+/*
+ * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
+ * and .. links.
+ */
+static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs(const struct pid_entry *entries,
+ unsigned int n)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int count;
+
+ count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ if (S_ISDIR(entries[i].mode))
+ ++count;
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
int maps_protect;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(maps_protect);
return result;
}
-#define MAY_PTRACE(task) \
- (task == current || \
- (task->parent == current && \
- (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && \
- (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) && \
- security_ptrace(current,task) == 0))
+/*
+ * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ */
+static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ /*
+ * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
+ * to use system calls instead of load instructions.
+ */
+ if (task == current)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If current is actively ptrace'ing, and would also be
+ * permitted to freshly attach with ptrace now, permit it.
+ */
+ if (task->parent == current && (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) &&
+ task_is_stopped_or_traced(task) &&
+ ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Noone else is allowed.
+ */
+ return -EPERM;
+}
struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
{
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ if (check_mem_permission(task))
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
this_len = (count > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : count;
retval = access_process_vm(task, src, page, this_len, 0);
- if (!retval || !MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task)) {
+ if (!retval || check_mem_permission(task)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EIO;
break;
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ if (check_mem_permission(task))
goto out;
copied = -ENOMEM;
#endif
+/*
+ * We added or removed a vma mapping the executable. The vmas are only mapped
+ * during exec and are not mapped with the mmap system call.
+ * Callers must hold down_write() on the mm's mmap_sem for these
+ */
+void added_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas++;
+}
+
+void removed_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas--;
+ if ((mm->num_exe_file_vmas == 0) && mm->exe_file){
+ fput(mm->exe_file);
+ mm->exe_file = NULL;
+ }
+
+}
+
+void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
+{
+ if (new_exe_file)
+ get_file(new_exe_file);
+ if (mm->exe_file)
+ fput(mm->exe_file);
+ mm->exe_file = new_exe_file;
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas = 0;
+}
+
+struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct file *exe_file;
+
+ /* We need mmap_sem to protect against races with removal of
+ * VM_EXECUTABLE vmas */
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ exe_file = mm->exe_file;
+ if (exe_file)
+ get_file(exe_file);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ return exe_file;
+}
+
+void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *newmm)
+{
+ /* It's safe to write the exe_file pointer without exe_file_lock because
+ * this is called during fork when the task is not yet in /proc */
+ newmm->exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm);
+}
+
+static int proc_exe_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *exe_path)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct file *exe_file;
+
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!task)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+ mmput(mm);
+ if (exe_file) {
+ *exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
+ path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
+ fput(exe_file);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+
static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, oom_adjust),
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, loginuid),
- REG("sessionid", S_IRUSR, sessionid),
+ REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, sessionid),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, fault_inject),
inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
- inode->i_nlink = 5;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- inode->i_nlink += 1;
-#endif
+
+ inode->i_nlink = 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tgid_base_stuff,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(tgid_base_stuff));
dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
- inode->i_nlink = 4;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- inode->i_nlink += 1;
-#endif
+
+ inode->i_nlink = 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tid_base_stuff,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff));
dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;