2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
19 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
20 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
23 #include <linux/module.h>
24 #include <linux/init.h>
25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
27 #include <linux/errno.h>
28 #include <linux/sched.h>
29 #include <linux/security.h>
30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
31 #include <linux/capability.h>
32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
34 #include <linux/mman.h>
35 #include <linux/slab.h>
36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
37 #include <linux/swap.h>
38 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/dccp.h>
62 #include <linux/quota.h>
63 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
65 #include <linux/parser.h>
66 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
68 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
69 #include <linux/personality.h>
70 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
71 #include <linux/audit.h>
72 #include <linux/string.h>
73 #include <linux/selinux.h>
74 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
82 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
83 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
85 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
86 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
87 extern int selinux_compat_net;
89 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
90 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
92 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
94 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
97 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
101 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
103 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
105 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
108 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
110 int selinux_enabled = 1;
113 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
114 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
116 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
117 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
118 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
119 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
120 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
122 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
123 before the policy was loaded. */
124 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
125 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
127 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
129 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
130 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
131 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
137 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
141 if (!buffer || !size)
142 goto getsecurity_exit;
146 goto getsecurity_exit;
148 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
155 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
157 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
159 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
161 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
166 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
167 task->security = tsec;
172 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
174 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
175 task->security = NULL;
179 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
181 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
184 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
188 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
189 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
191 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
192 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
193 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
194 inode->i_security = isec;
199 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
201 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
202 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
204 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
206 list_del_init(&isec->list);
207 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
209 inode->i_security = NULL;
210 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
213 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
218 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
223 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
224 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
225 file->f_security = fsec;
230 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
232 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
233 file->f_security = NULL;
237 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
239 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
241 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
245 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
248 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
250 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
251 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
252 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sb->s_security = sbsec;
258 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
260 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
262 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
263 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
264 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
265 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
267 sb->s_security = NULL;
271 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
273 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
275 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
326 static match_table_t tokens = {
327 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
328 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
329 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
330 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
333 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
335 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
336 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
337 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
341 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
342 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
351 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
352 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
353 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
356 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
357 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
361 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
366 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
368 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
369 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
372 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
373 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
374 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
379 name = sb->s_type->name;
381 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
383 /* NFS we understand. */
384 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
385 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
387 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
391 context = d->context;
398 /* Standard string-based options. */
399 char *p, *options = data;
401 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
403 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
408 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
412 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
414 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
417 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
428 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
430 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
433 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
440 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
443 case Opt_rootcontext:
444 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
446 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
449 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
456 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
460 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
462 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
463 "defcontext option is invalid "
464 "for this filesystem type\n");
467 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
469 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
472 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
479 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
484 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
495 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
497 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
499 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
500 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
501 fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
505 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
513 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
514 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
515 * the superblock context if not already set.
518 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
520 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
521 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
522 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
527 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
532 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
536 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
538 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
542 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
543 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
544 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
546 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
547 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
548 rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
552 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
557 isec->initialized = 1;
561 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
563 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
564 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
565 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
569 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
572 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
576 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
590 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
592 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
593 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
594 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
597 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
598 if (sbsec->initialized)
601 if (!ss_initialized) {
602 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
603 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
604 server is ready to handle calls. */
605 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
606 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
607 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
608 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
612 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
613 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
615 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
616 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
620 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
624 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
625 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
626 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
627 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
628 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
629 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
630 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
631 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
632 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
636 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
637 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
638 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
639 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
640 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
641 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
644 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
645 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
650 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
653 sbsec->initialized = 1;
655 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
656 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
657 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
660 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
661 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
662 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
665 /* Initialize the root inode. */
666 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
668 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
669 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
670 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
672 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
674 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
675 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
676 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
677 struct inode_security_struct, list);
678 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
679 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
680 inode = igrab(inode);
682 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
686 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
687 list_del_init(&isec->list);
690 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
692 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
696 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
698 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
700 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
702 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
704 return SECCLASS_FILE;
706 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
710 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
712 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
716 return SECCLASS_FILE;
719 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
721 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
724 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
726 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
729 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
736 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
738 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
745 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
746 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
748 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
750 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
751 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
753 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
755 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
757 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
763 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
764 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
765 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
766 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
767 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
769 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
771 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
772 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
773 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
775 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
777 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
778 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
779 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
780 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
781 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
783 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
786 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
788 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
790 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
793 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
796 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
797 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
802 char *buffer, *path, *end;
804 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
814 while (de && de != de->parent) {
815 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
819 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
824 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
825 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
829 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
837 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
838 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
840 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
841 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
843 struct dentry *dentry;
844 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
845 char *context = NULL;
849 if (isec->initialized)
852 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
853 if (isec->initialized)
856 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
857 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
858 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
859 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
860 server is ready to handle calls. */
861 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
862 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
863 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
864 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
868 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
869 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
870 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
871 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
875 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
876 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
878 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
879 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
881 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
882 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
885 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
886 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
891 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
892 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
898 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
901 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
902 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
910 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
916 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
922 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
923 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
924 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
925 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
929 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
930 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
933 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
936 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
937 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
938 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
939 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
941 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
949 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
950 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
952 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
953 /* Default to the fs SID. */
954 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
956 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
957 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
958 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
966 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
967 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
970 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
971 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
974 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
976 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
977 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
988 isec->initialized = 1;
991 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
993 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
994 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
998 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
999 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1005 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1006 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1009 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1010 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1013 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1014 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1017 /* All other signals. */
1018 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1025 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1026 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1027 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1028 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1031 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1033 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1034 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1035 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1036 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1039 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1040 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1043 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1044 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1046 tsec = tsk->security;
1048 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1052 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1053 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1056 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1057 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1060 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1062 tsec = tsk->security;
1064 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1065 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1068 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1069 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1070 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1071 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1072 struct inode *inode,
1074 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1076 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1077 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1078 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1080 tsec = tsk->security;
1081 isec = inode->i_security;
1085 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1086 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1089 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1092 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1093 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1094 pathname if needed. */
1095 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1096 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1097 struct dentry *dentry,
1100 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1101 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1102 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1104 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1105 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1108 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1109 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1110 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1111 check a particular permission to the file.
1112 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1113 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1114 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1115 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1116 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1120 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1121 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1122 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
1123 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
1124 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1125 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1128 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1130 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1132 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1133 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1141 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1143 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1148 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1149 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1150 struct dentry *dentry,
1153 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1154 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1155 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1157 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1160 tsec = current->security;
1161 dsec = dir->i_security;
1162 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1164 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1165 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1167 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1168 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1173 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1174 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1176 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1182 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1186 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1187 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1188 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1191 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1192 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1193 struct task_struct *ctx)
1195 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1197 tsec = ctx->security;
1199 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1203 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1206 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1207 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1208 struct dentry *dentry,
1212 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1213 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1218 tsec = current->security;
1219 dsec = dir->i_security;
1220 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1222 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1223 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1226 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1227 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1242 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1246 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1250 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1251 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1252 struct inode *new_dir,
1253 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1255 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1256 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1257 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1259 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1262 tsec = current->security;
1263 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1264 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1265 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1266 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1268 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1270 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1271 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1272 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1275 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1276 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1279 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1280 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1281 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1286 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1287 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1288 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1289 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1290 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1293 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1294 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1295 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1296 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1298 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1306 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1307 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1308 struct super_block *sb,
1310 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1312 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1313 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1315 tsec = tsk->security;
1316 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1317 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1321 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1322 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1326 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1327 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1328 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1329 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1332 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1334 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1338 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1340 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1342 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1349 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1350 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1354 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1356 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1357 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1366 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1368 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1370 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1371 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1374 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1378 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1379 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1380 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1381 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1385 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1386 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1390 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1394 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1397 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1398 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1402 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1406 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1409 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1410 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1412 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1415 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1419 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1423 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1426 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1430 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1434 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1438 tsec = current->security;
1440 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1441 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1443 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1444 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1447 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1448 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1450 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1451 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1459 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1460 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1466 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1479 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1481 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1486 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1488 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1491 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1497 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1499 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1502 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1506 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1511 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1512 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1513 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1515 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1516 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1517 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1518 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1520 case 0: /* Close log */
1521 case 1: /* Open log */
1522 case 2: /* Read from log */
1523 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1524 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1526 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1533 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1534 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1535 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1537 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1538 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1539 * the capability is granted.
1541 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1542 * processes that allocate mappings.
1544 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1546 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1547 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1549 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1551 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1552 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1553 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1559 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1562 /* binprm security operations */
1564 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1566 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1568 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1573 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1576 bprm->security = bsec;
1580 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1582 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1583 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1584 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1585 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1587 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1590 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1594 bsec = bprm->security;
1599 tsec = current->security;
1600 isec = inode->i_security;
1602 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1603 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1605 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1606 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1607 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1608 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1610 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1611 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1612 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1615 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1616 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1617 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1622 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1623 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
1624 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
1626 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1629 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1630 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1631 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1635 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1636 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1637 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1641 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1642 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1646 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1647 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1649 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1657 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1659 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1663 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1665 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1668 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1669 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1670 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1671 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1672 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1674 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1677 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1680 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1682 kfree(bprm->security);
1683 bprm->security = NULL;
1686 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1687 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1689 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1690 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1692 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1693 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1694 struct tty_struct *tty;
1695 struct fdtable *fdt;
1699 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1700 tty = get_current_tty();
1703 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1705 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1706 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1707 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1708 file may belong to another process and we are only
1709 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1710 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1711 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1712 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1718 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1720 proc_set_tty(current, NULL);
1722 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1724 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1726 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1728 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1730 unsigned long set, i;
1735 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1736 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
1738 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1741 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1742 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1747 if (file_has_perm(current,
1749 file_to_av(file))) {
1751 fd = get_unused_fd();
1761 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1762 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1769 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1774 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1777 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1780 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1782 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1783 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1787 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1789 tsec = current->security;
1791 bsec = bprm->security;
1794 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1796 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1797 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1798 unchanged and kill. */
1799 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1800 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1801 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1808 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1809 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1810 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1811 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1812 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1824 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1826 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1828 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1829 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1830 struct itimerval itimer;
1831 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1834 tsec = current->security;
1835 bsec = bprm->security;
1838 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1841 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1844 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1845 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1847 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1848 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1849 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1850 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1851 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1852 will be checked against the new SID. */
1853 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1854 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1856 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1857 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1858 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1859 flush_signals(current);
1860 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1861 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1862 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1863 recalc_sigpending();
1864 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1867 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1868 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1869 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1870 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1871 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1872 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1873 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1874 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1875 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1877 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1878 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1880 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1881 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1882 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1883 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1885 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1887 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1890 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1894 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1895 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1896 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1899 /* superblock security operations */
1901 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1903 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1906 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1908 superblock_free_security(sb);
1911 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1916 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1919 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1921 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1922 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1923 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1924 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1927 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1934 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1938 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1941 int current_size = 0;
1950 while (current_size < len) {
1960 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1962 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1963 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1964 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1970 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1971 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1972 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1976 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1984 in_save = in_end = orig;
1988 open_quote = !open_quote;
1989 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
1991 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1993 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1994 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1996 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1998 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2000 } while (*in_end++);
2002 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2003 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2008 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2010 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2013 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2017 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2018 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2019 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2022 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2024 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2026 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2027 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2028 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2031 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2032 struct nameidata *nd,
2034 unsigned long flags,
2039 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2043 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2044 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2045 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2047 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2051 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2055 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2059 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2060 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2063 /* inode security operations */
2065 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2067 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2070 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2072 inode_free_security(inode);
2075 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2076 char **name, void **value,
2079 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2080 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2081 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2084 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2086 tsec = current->security;
2087 dsec = dir->i_security;
2088 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2090 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2091 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2093 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2094 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2097 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2098 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2101 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2106 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2107 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2108 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2109 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2111 isec->initialized = 1;
2114 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2118 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2125 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2137 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2139 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2142 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2146 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2149 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2152 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2156 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2159 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2162 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2164 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2167 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2169 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2172 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2174 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2177 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2181 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2185 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2188 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2189 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2191 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2194 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2196 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2199 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2203 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2206 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2209 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2210 struct nameidata *nd)
2214 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2219 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2223 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2224 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2227 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2231 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2235 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2238 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2239 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2240 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2242 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2245 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2247 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2250 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2252 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2253 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2256 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2260 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2261 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2262 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2263 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2264 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2265 Restrict to administrator. */
2269 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2270 ordinary setattr permission. */
2271 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2274 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2275 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2278 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2281 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2282 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2284 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2285 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2289 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2293 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2294 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2298 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2303 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2305 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2306 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2310 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2311 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2313 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2314 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2318 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2319 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2323 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2325 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2326 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2334 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2336 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2339 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2341 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2344 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2346 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2347 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2348 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2349 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2350 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2351 Restrict to administrator. */
2355 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2356 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2357 permission for removexattr. */
2358 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2361 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2362 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2366 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2368 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2372 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2373 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2374 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2376 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2378 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2380 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2382 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2385 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2388 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2389 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2391 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2395 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2398 if (!value || !size)
2401 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2409 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2411 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2412 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2413 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2417 /* file security operations */
2419 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2422 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2425 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2429 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2430 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2433 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2434 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2438 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2441 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2443 return file_alloc_security(file);
2446 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2448 file_free_security(file);
2451 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2463 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2465 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2466 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2469 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2471 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2472 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2475 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2479 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2484 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2487 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2488 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2491 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2497 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2499 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2500 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2502 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2503 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2504 * This has an additional check.
2506 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2513 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2514 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2516 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2517 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2520 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2521 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2523 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2528 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2529 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2533 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2537 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2540 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2541 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2544 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2545 unsigned long reqprot,
2550 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2554 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2557 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2558 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2560 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2561 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2562 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2564 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2565 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2566 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2567 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2568 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2570 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2571 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2572 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2573 * modified content. This typically should only
2574 * occur for text relocations.
2576 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2584 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2587 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2589 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2592 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2599 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2604 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2605 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2614 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2615 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2620 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2625 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2629 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2636 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2638 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2639 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2641 tsec = current->security;
2642 fsec = file->f_security;
2643 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2648 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2649 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2653 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2654 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2656 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2657 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
2659 tsec = tsk->security;
2660 fsec = file->f_security;
2663 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2665 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2667 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2668 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2671 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2673 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2676 /* task security operations */
2678 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2682 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2686 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2689 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2691 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2694 tsec1 = current->security;
2696 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2699 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2701 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2702 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2704 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2705 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2706 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2707 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2708 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2710 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2711 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2712 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2713 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2718 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2720 task_free_security(tsk);
2723 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2725 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2726 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2727 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2728 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2729 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2734 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2736 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2739 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2741 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2745 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2747 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2750 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2752 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2755 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2757 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2760 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2762 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2765 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2767 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2771 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2775 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2779 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2782 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2784 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2787 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2789 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2792 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2794 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2797 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2801 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2802 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2803 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2804 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2805 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2806 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2811 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2813 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2816 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2818 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2821 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2823 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2826 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2831 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2833 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2837 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2841 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2843 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2846 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2848 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2852 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2858 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2859 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2860 the state of the current process. */
2864 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2868 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2870 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2873 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2875 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2877 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2880 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2881 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2885 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2886 struct inode *inode)
2888 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2889 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2891 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2892 isec->initialized = 1;
2896 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2897 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
2898 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
2900 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2901 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2903 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2904 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2908 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2909 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2912 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2913 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2917 *proto = ih->protocol;
2919 switch (ih->protocol) {
2921 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2923 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2927 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2931 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2932 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2937 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2939 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2943 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2947 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2948 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2952 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
2953 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
2955 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2959 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
2963 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
2964 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
2975 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2977 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2978 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
2979 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
2982 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2983 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2985 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2986 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2990 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2991 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2994 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2995 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2996 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3005 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3007 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3011 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3012 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3017 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3019 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3023 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3024 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3028 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3029 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3031 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3035 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3036 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3040 /* includes fragments */
3050 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3051 char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
3055 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3057 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3061 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3062 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3065 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3067 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3071 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3072 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3082 /* socket security operations */
3083 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3086 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3087 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3088 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3091 tsec = task->security;
3092 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3094 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3097 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3098 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3099 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3105 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3106 int protocol, int kern)
3109 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3115 tsec = current->security;
3116 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3117 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3118 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3119 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3125 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3126 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3129 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3130 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3131 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3134 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3136 tsec = current->security;
3137 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3138 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3139 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3140 isec->initialized = 1;
3143 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3144 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3145 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3151 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3152 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3153 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3154 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3155 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3157 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3162 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3167 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3168 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3169 * check the first address now.
3171 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3172 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3174 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3175 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3176 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3177 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3178 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3179 unsigned short snum;
3180 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3181 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3183 tsec = current->security;
3184 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3186 if (family == PF_INET) {
3187 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3188 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3189 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3190 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3192 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3193 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3194 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3195 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3198 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3199 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3200 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3201 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3204 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3205 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3206 ad.u.net.family = family;
3207 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3209 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3214 switch(isec->sclass) {
3215 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3216 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3219 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3220 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3223 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3224 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3228 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3232 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3236 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3237 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3238 ad.u.net.family = family;
3240 if (family == PF_INET)
3241 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3243 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3245 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3246 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3254 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3256 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3259 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3264 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3266 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3267 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3268 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3269 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3270 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3271 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3272 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3273 unsigned short snum;
3276 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3277 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3278 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3280 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3282 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3283 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3285 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3288 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3289 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3293 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3294 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3296 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3297 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3298 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3299 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3308 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3310 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3313 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3316 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3317 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3319 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3323 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3325 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3326 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3327 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3328 newisec->initialized = 1;
3333 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3338 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3342 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3345 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3346 int size, int flags)
3348 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3351 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3353 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3356 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3358 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3361 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3365 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3369 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3372 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3375 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3378 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3380 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3383 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3384 struct socket *other,
3387 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3388 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3389 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3390 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3393 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3397 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3398 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3400 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3401 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3403 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3405 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3409 /* connecting socket */
3410 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3411 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3413 /* server child socket */
3414 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3415 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3416 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3421 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3422 struct socket *other)
3424 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3425 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3426 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3429 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3430 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3432 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3433 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3435 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3436 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3443 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3444 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3447 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3448 struct socket *sock;
3452 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3453 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3455 struct inode *inode;
3456 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3458 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3459 isec = inode->i_security;
3460 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3461 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3464 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3471 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3475 switch (sock_class) {
3476 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3477 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3478 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3479 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3482 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3483 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3484 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3485 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3488 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3489 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3490 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3491 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3495 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3496 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3500 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3504 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3508 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3515 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3516 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3521 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3522 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3529 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3534 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3535 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3537 family = sk->sk_family;
3538 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3541 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3542 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3545 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3546 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3547 ad.u.net.family = family;
3549 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
3553 if (selinux_compat_net)
3554 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3557 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3562 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3566 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3571 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3572 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3577 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3578 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3579 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3581 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3583 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
3584 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3585 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3586 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3588 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3593 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3598 if (scontext_len > len) {
3603 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3607 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3615 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3617 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3620 if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3621 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3623 security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb,
3624 SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
3627 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3629 *secid = peer_secid;
3634 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3636 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3639 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3641 sk_free_security(sk);
3644 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3646 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3647 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3649 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3650 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3652 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
3655 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3658 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3660 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3662 *secid = sksec->sid;
3666 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3668 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3669 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3671 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3672 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3673 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3675 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3678 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3679 struct request_sock *req)
3681 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3686 security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
3687 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3688 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3689 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3693 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3697 req->secid = newsid;
3698 req->peer_secid = peersid;
3702 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3703 const struct request_sock *req)
3705 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3707 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3708 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
3709 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3710 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3711 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3712 time it will have been created and available. */
3714 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
3715 * thread with access to newsksec */
3716 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3719 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
3720 struct sk_buff *skb)
3722 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3724 security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
3727 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3730 fl->secid = req->secid;
3733 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3737 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3738 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3739 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3741 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3745 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3747 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3749 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3750 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3751 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3752 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3753 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3754 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3764 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3769 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3771 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3772 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3773 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3776 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3777 struct socket *sock;
3778 struct inode *inode;
3779 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3781 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3785 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3789 isec = inode->i_security;
3791 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3795 switch (isec->sclass) {
3796 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3797 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3798 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3799 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3802 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3803 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3804 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3805 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3808 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3809 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
3810 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
3811 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3815 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3816 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3820 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3824 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3828 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3835 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3838 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3843 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3850 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3851 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3852 const struct net_device *in,
3853 const struct net_device *out,
3854 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3860 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3861 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3862 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3863 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3870 sksec = sk->sk_security;
3872 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3873 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3874 ad.u.net.family = family;
3876 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
3880 if (selinux_compat_net)
3881 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3882 family, addrp, len);
3884 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3890 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
3892 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3895 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3896 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3897 const struct net_device *in,
3898 const struct net_device *out,
3899 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3901 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3904 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3906 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3907 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3908 const struct net_device *in,
3909 const struct net_device *out,
3910 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3912 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3917 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3919 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3923 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3927 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3928 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3933 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
3936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3938 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
3942 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
3943 ad.u.cap = capability;
3945 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
3946 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
3949 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3950 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3953 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3954 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3956 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3960 isec->sclass = sclass;
3961 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3962 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3963 perm->security = isec;
3968 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3970 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3971 perm->security = NULL;
3975 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3977 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3979 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3984 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3985 msg->security = msec;
3990 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3992 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3994 msg->security = NULL;
3998 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4001 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4002 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4003 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4005 tsec = current->security;
4006 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4008 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4009 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4011 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4014 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4016 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4019 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4021 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4024 /* message queue security operations */
4025 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4027 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4028 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4029 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4032 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4036 tsec = current->security;
4037 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4039 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4040 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4042 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4045 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4051 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4053 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4056 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4058 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4059 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4060 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4062 tsec = current->security;
4063 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4065 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4066 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4068 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4069 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4072 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4080 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4081 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4084 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4087 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4090 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4096 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4100 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4102 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4103 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4104 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4105 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4108 tsec = current->security;
4109 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4110 msec = msg->security;
4113 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4115 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4117 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4118 * message queue this message will be stored in
4120 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4128 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4129 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4131 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4132 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4135 /* Can this process send the message */
4136 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4137 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4139 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4140 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4141 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4146 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4147 struct task_struct *target,
4148 long type, int mode)
4150 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4151 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4152 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4153 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4156 tsec = target->security;
4157 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4158 msec = msg->security;
4160 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4161 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4163 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4164 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4166 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4167 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4171 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4172 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4174 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4175 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4176 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4179 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4183 tsec = current->security;
4184 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4186 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4187 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4189 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4192 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4198 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4200 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4203 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4205 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4206 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4207 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4209 tsec = current->security;
4210 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4212 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4213 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4215 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4216 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4219 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4220 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4228 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4229 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4232 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4235 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4242 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4248 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4252 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4253 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4258 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4262 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4265 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4267 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4270 /* Semaphore security operations */
4271 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4273 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4274 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4275 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4278 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4282 tsec = current->security;
4283 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4285 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4286 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4288 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4291 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4297 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4299 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4302 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4304 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4305 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4306 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4308 tsec = current->security;
4309 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4311 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4312 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4314 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4315 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4318 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4319 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4327 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4328 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4332 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4343 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4346 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4350 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4356 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4360 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4361 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4366 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4370 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4373 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4379 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4381 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4386 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4389 /* module stacking operations */
4390 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4392 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4393 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4394 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4398 secondary_ops = ops;
4400 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4407 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4409 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4410 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4411 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4415 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4420 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4423 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4426 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4427 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4429 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4434 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4441 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4443 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4445 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4446 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4447 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4448 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4449 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4450 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4451 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4452 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4459 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4462 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4463 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4465 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4471 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4472 security attributes. */
4477 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4478 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4479 * above restriction is ever removed.
4481 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4482 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4483 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4484 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4485 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4486 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4487 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4488 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4489 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4490 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4496 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4497 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4498 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4502 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4507 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4508 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4509 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4510 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4511 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4512 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4514 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4515 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4516 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4517 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4518 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4519 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4522 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4523 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4524 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4525 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4526 struct av_decision avd;
4531 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4532 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4533 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4534 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4535 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4536 do_each_thread(g, t)
4537 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4538 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4541 while_each_thread(g, t);
4542 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4545 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4546 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4547 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4551 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4552 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4554 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4555 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4557 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4561 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4562 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4576 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4578 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4581 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4589 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4590 unsigned long flags)
4592 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4593 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4595 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4600 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4601 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4603 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4609 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4611 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4617 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4618 struct task_struct *ctx,
4622 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4623 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4625 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4627 tsec = ctx->security;
4628 ksec = key->security;
4630 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4631 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4632 appear to be created. */
4636 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4637 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4642 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4643 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4644 .capget = selinux_capget,
4645 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4646 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4647 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4648 .capable = selinux_capable,
4649 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4650 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4651 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4652 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4654 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4655 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4657 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4658 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4659 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4660 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4661 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4662 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4663 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4665 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4666 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4667 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4668 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4669 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4670 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4671 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4673 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4674 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4675 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4676 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4677 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4678 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4679 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4680 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4681 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4682 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4683 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4684 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4685 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4686 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4687 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4688 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4689 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4690 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4691 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4692 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4693 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4694 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4695 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4696 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4697 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4699 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4700 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4701 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4702 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4703 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4704 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4705 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4706 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4707 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4708 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4709 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4711 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4712 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4713 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4714 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4715 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4716 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4717 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4718 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4719 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4720 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
4721 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4722 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4723 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4724 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
4725 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4726 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4727 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4728 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4729 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4730 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4731 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4732 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4733 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4735 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4737 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4738 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4740 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4741 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4742 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4743 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4744 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4745 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4747 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4748 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4749 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4750 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4751 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4753 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4754 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4755 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4756 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4757 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4759 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4760 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4762 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4764 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4765 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4767 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4768 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
4770 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4771 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4773 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4774 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4775 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4776 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4777 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4778 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4779 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4780 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4781 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4782 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4783 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4784 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4785 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4786 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4787 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4788 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4789 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4790 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4791 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
4792 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
4793 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
4794 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
4795 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4796 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
4797 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
4799 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4800 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4801 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4802 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4803 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4804 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4805 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4806 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4807 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4808 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4809 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4813 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4814 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4815 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4819 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4821 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4823 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4824 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4828 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4830 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4831 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4832 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4833 tsec = current->security;
4834 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4836 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4837 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4838 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4841 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4843 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4844 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4845 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4847 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4848 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4850 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4854 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4855 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4856 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4857 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4858 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4864 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4866 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4868 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4869 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4870 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4871 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4873 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4874 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4875 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4876 struct superblock_security_struct,
4878 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4880 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4881 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4882 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4884 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4886 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4887 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4888 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4891 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4892 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4895 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4896 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4897 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4899 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4901 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4902 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4903 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4905 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4906 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4909 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4911 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4912 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4913 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4915 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4916 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4921 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4925 if (!selinux_enabled)
4928 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4930 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4932 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4934 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4936 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4938 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4946 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4948 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4949 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4951 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4953 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4954 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4955 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4960 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4962 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4963 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4966 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4968 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4969 int selinux_disable(void)
4971 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4972 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4974 if (ss_initialized) {
4975 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4979 if (selinux_disabled) {
4980 /* Only do this once. */
4984 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4986 selinux_disabled = 1;
4987 selinux_enabled = 0;
4989 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4990 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4992 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4993 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4995 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */