2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
43 #include <linux/namei.h>
44 #include <linux/mount.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
53 #include <net/netlabel.h>
54 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
55 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
56 #include <asm/atomic.h>
57 #include <linux/bitops.h>
58 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
59 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
60 #include <linux/netlink.h>
61 #include <linux/tcp.h>
62 #include <linux/udp.h>
63 #include <linux/dccp.h>
64 #include <linux/quota.h>
65 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
66 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <linux/parser.h>
68 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
71 #include <linux/personality.h>
72 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
73 #include <linux/audit.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/selinux.h>
76 #include <linux/mutex.h>
87 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
88 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
90 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
92 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
93 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
94 extern int selinux_compat_net;
95 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
129 static struct security_operations *original_ops;
131 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
133 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
134 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
161 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 task->security = tsec;
175 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
178 task->security = NULL;
182 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
184 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
187 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
191 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
192 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
194 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
195 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
196 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
197 inode->i_security = isec;
202 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
204 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
205 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
207 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
209 list_del_init(&isec->list);
210 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
212 inode->i_security = NULL;
213 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
216 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
218 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
219 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
221 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
225 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
226 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
227 file->f_security = fsec;
232 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
235 file->f_security = NULL;
239 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
241 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
243 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
247 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
250 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
252 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
254 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
255 sb->s_security = sbsec;
260 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
262 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
264 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
265 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
266 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
267 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
269 sb->s_security = NULL;
273 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
275 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
277 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
328 static match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
369 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
372 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
373 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
376 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
377 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
378 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
379 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
380 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
381 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
382 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
384 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
388 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
389 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
390 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
391 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
392 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
396 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
397 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
402 sbsec->initialized = 1;
404 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
405 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
408 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
409 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
410 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
412 /* Initialize the root inode. */
413 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
415 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
416 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
417 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
419 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
421 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
422 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
423 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
424 struct inode_security_struct, list);
425 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
426 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
427 inode = igrab(inode);
429 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
433 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 list_del_init(&isec->list);
437 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
443 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
444 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
445 * mount options, or whatever.
447 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
448 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
452 char *context = NULL;
456 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
458 if (!sbsec->initialized)
465 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
466 * settings this is going to need a mask
469 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
470 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
472 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
476 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
482 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
483 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
489 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
490 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
493 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
494 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
496 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
497 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
500 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
501 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
503 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
504 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
507 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
508 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
510 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
514 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->initialized)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!sbsec->initialized)
543 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
575 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
576 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
582 "before the security server is initialized\n");
587 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
588 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
589 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
590 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
592 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
593 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
594 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
595 * will be used for both mounts)
597 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
602 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
603 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
604 * than once with different security options.
606 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->initialized) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
718 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
719 root_isec->initialized = 1;
722 if (defcontext_sid) {
723 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
725 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
726 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
730 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
737 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
740 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
742 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
747 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
751 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
752 struct super_block *newsb)
754 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
755 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
757 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
762 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
763 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
766 if (!ss_initialized) {
767 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
768 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
769 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
774 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
775 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
777 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
778 if (newsbsec->initialized)
781 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
783 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
785 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
786 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
787 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
790 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
794 if (!set_rootcontext) {
795 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
796 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
799 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
801 if (set_rootcontext) {
802 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
804 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
807 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
810 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
811 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
814 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
815 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
818 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
819 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
820 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
824 /* Standard string-based options. */
825 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
827 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
832 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
836 if (context || defcontext) {
838 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
841 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
854 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
861 case Opt_rootcontext:
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
867 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
875 if (context || defcontext) {
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
880 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
896 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
902 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
920 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
934 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
936 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
939 char *options = data;
940 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
942 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
947 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
949 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
954 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
957 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
961 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
963 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
965 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
967 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
969 return SECCLASS_FILE;
971 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
975 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
977 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
981 return SECCLASS_FILE;
984 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
986 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
989 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
991 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
994 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1000 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1001 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1003 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1010 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1011 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1013 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1015 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1016 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1018 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1020 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1022 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1028 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1029 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1030 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1031 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1032 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1034 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1036 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1037 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1038 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1040 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1041 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1042 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1043 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1044 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1045 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1046 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1048 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1051 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1053 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1055 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1058 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1061 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1062 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1067 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1069 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1074 end = buffer+buflen;
1079 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1080 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1084 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1089 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1090 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1094 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1102 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1103 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1105 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1106 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1108 struct dentry *dentry;
1109 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1110 char *context = NULL;
1114 if (isec->initialized)
1117 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1118 if (isec->initialized)
1121 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1122 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1123 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1124 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1125 server is ready to handle calls. */
1126 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1127 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1128 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1129 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1133 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1134 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1135 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1136 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1140 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1141 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1143 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1144 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1146 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1147 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1150 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1151 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1156 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1157 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1163 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1165 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1166 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1167 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1175 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1181 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1187 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1188 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1189 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1190 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1194 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1195 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1198 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1202 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1203 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1204 __func__, context, -rc,
1205 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1207 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1215 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1216 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1218 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1219 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1220 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1222 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1223 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1224 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1232 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1233 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1236 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1237 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1240 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1242 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1243 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1254 isec->initialized = 1;
1257 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1259 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1260 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1264 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1265 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1271 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1272 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1275 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1276 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1279 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1280 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1283 /* All other signals. */
1284 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1291 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1292 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1293 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1294 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1297 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1299 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1300 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1301 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1302 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1305 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1306 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1309 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1310 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1313 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1314 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1316 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1318 tsec = tsk->security;
1320 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1324 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1326 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1329 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1333 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1336 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1339 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1340 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1343 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1345 tsec = tsk->security;
1347 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1348 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1351 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1352 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1353 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1354 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1355 struct inode *inode,
1357 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1359 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1360 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1361 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1363 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1366 tsec = tsk->security;
1367 isec = inode->i_security;
1371 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1372 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1375 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1378 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1379 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1380 pathname if needed. */
1381 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1382 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1383 struct dentry *dentry,
1386 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1387 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1388 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1389 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1390 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1391 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1394 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1395 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1396 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1397 check a particular permission to the file.
1398 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1399 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1400 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1401 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1402 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1406 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1407 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1408 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1409 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1412 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1413 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1415 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1416 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1424 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1426 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1431 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1432 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1433 struct dentry *dentry,
1436 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1437 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1438 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1440 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443 tsec = current->security;
1444 dsec = dir->i_security;
1445 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1447 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1448 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1450 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1451 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1456 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1457 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1459 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1465 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1469 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1470 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1471 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1474 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1475 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1476 struct task_struct *ctx)
1478 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1480 tsec = ctx->security;
1482 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1486 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1489 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1490 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1491 struct dentry *dentry,
1495 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1496 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1497 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1501 tsec = current->security;
1502 dsec = dir->i_security;
1503 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1505 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1506 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1509 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1510 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1525 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1530 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1534 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1535 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1536 struct inode *new_dir,
1537 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1539 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1540 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1546 tsec = current->security;
1547 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1548 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1549 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1550 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1552 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1554 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1555 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1556 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1559 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1560 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1563 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1564 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1565 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1570 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1571 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1572 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1573 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1574 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1577 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1578 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1579 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1580 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1582 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1590 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1591 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1592 struct super_block *sb,
1594 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1596 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1597 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1599 tsec = tsk->security;
1600 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1601 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1605 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1606 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1610 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1611 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1612 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1613 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1616 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1618 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1622 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1624 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1626 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1634 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1637 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1639 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1641 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1643 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1647 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1648 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1649 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1650 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1651 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1652 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1653 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1656 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1657 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1662 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1663 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1667 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1669 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1670 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1677 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1685 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1687 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
1688 struct task_struct *child,
1693 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode);
1697 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1698 struct task_security_struct *tsec = parent->security;
1699 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1700 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1701 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1704 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1707 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1708 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1712 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1716 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1719 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1720 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1724 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1728 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1731 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1732 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1734 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1737 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1741 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1745 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1748 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1751 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1754 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1759 end = buffer+buflen;
1765 const char *name = table->procname;
1766 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1767 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1771 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1774 table = table->parent;
1780 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1782 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1784 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1789 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1793 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1797 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1801 tsec = current->security;
1803 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1804 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1806 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1807 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1810 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1811 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1813 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1814 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1822 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1823 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1829 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1842 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1848 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1852 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1858 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1860 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1863 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1867 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1872 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1873 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1874 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1876 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1877 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1878 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1879 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1881 case 0: /* Close log */
1882 case 1: /* Open log */
1883 case 2: /* Read from log */
1884 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1885 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1887 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1894 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1895 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1896 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1898 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1899 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1900 * the capability is granted.
1902 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1903 * processes that allocate mappings.
1905 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1907 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1908 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1910 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1912 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1913 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1914 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1921 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1925 * task_tracer_task - return the task that is tracing the given task
1926 * @task: task to consider
1928 * Returns NULL if noone is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct
1929 * pointer to its tracer.
1931 * Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
1933 static struct task_struct *task_tracer_task(struct task_struct *task)
1935 if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
1936 return rcu_dereference(task->parent);
1940 /* binprm security operations */
1942 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1944 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1946 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1950 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1953 bprm->security = bsec;
1957 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1959 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1960 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1961 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1962 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1964 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1967 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1971 bsec = bprm->security;
1976 tsec = current->security;
1977 isec = inode->i_security;
1979 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1980 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1982 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1983 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1984 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1985 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1987 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1988 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1989 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1992 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1993 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1994 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1999 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2000 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2002 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2005 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2006 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2007 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2011 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2012 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2013 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2017 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2018 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2022 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2023 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2025 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2033 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2035 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2039 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2041 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2044 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2045 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2046 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2047 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2048 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2050 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2053 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2056 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2058 kfree(bprm->security);
2059 bprm->security = NULL;
2062 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2063 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2065 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2066 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2068 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2069 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2070 struct tty_struct *tty;
2071 struct fdtable *fdt;
2075 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2076 tty = get_current_tty();
2079 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2081 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2082 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2083 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2084 file may belong to another process and we are only
2085 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2086 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2088 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2094 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2095 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2099 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2101 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2103 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2105 unsigned long set, i;
2110 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2111 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2113 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2116 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2117 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2122 if (file_has_perm(current,
2124 file_to_av(file))) {
2126 fd = get_unused_fd();
2136 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2137 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2144 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2149 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2152 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2155 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2157 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2158 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2162 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2164 tsec = current->security;
2166 bsec = bprm->security;
2169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2171 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2172 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2173 unchanged and kill. */
2174 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2175 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2176 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2183 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2184 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2185 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2186 struct task_struct *tracer;
2187 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2191 tracer = task_tracer_task(current);
2192 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2193 sec = tracer->security;
2199 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2200 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2212 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2214 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2216 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2217 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2218 struct itimerval itimer;
2219 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2222 tsec = current->security;
2223 bsec = bprm->security;
2226 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2229 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2232 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2233 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2235 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2236 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2237 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2238 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2239 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2240 will be checked against the new SID. */
2241 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2242 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2244 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2245 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2246 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2247 flush_signals(current);
2248 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2249 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2250 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2251 recalc_sigpending();
2252 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2255 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2256 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2258 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2259 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2260 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2261 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2262 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2263 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2264 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2265 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2266 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2268 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2269 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2271 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2272 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2273 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2274 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2276 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2278 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2281 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2285 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2286 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2287 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2290 /* superblock security operations */
2292 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2294 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2297 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2299 superblock_free_security(sb);
2302 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2307 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2310 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2312 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2313 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2314 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2315 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2318 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2325 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2329 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2332 int current_size = 0;
2340 while (current_size < len) {
2350 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2352 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2353 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2354 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2360 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2368 in_save = in_end = orig;
2372 open_quote = !open_quote;
2373 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2375 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2377 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2378 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2380 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2382 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2384 } while (*in_end++);
2386 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2387 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2392 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2394 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2397 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2401 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2402 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2403 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2406 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2408 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2410 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2411 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2412 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2415 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2418 unsigned long flags,
2423 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2427 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2428 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2429 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2431 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2435 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2439 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2443 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2444 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2447 /* inode security operations */
2449 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2451 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2454 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2456 inode_free_security(inode);
2459 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2460 char **name, void **value,
2463 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2464 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2465 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2468 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2470 tsec = current->security;
2471 dsec = dir->i_security;
2472 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2474 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2475 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2477 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2478 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2481 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2482 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2485 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2490 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2491 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2492 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2493 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2495 isec->initialized = 1;
2498 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2502 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2509 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2521 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2523 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2526 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2530 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2533 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2536 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2540 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2543 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2546 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2548 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2551 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2553 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2556 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2558 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2561 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2565 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2569 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2572 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2573 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2575 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2578 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2580 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2583 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2587 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2590 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2593 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2594 struct nameidata *nd)
2598 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2603 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2607 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2608 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2611 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2615 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2619 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2622 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2623 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2624 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2626 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2629 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2631 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2634 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2636 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2637 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2638 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2639 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2641 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2642 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2643 Restrict to administrator. */
2648 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2649 ordinary setattr permission. */
2650 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2653 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2654 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2656 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2657 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2658 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2659 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2660 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2664 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2665 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2667 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2668 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2671 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2674 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2675 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2677 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2678 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2682 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2683 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2684 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2686 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2691 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2692 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2696 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2701 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2703 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2704 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2708 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2709 const void *value, size_t size,
2712 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2713 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2717 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2718 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2722 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2724 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2725 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2726 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2734 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2736 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2739 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2741 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2744 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2746 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2747 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2749 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2750 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2755 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2757 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2759 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2763 char *context = NULL;
2764 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2765 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2767 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2771 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2772 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2773 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2774 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2775 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2776 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2777 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2779 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2781 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2782 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2783 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2787 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2790 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2803 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2804 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2806 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2810 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2813 if (!value || !size)
2816 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2824 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2826 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2827 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2828 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2832 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2834 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2837 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2839 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2842 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2844 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2848 /* file security operations */
2850 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2853 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2856 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2860 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2861 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2864 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2865 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2869 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2872 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2874 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2875 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2876 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2877 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2880 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2884 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2885 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2886 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2888 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2891 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2893 return file_alloc_security(file);
2896 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2898 file_free_security(file);
2901 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2906 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2908 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2913 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2916 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2918 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2919 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2921 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2922 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2923 * This has an additional check.
2925 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2932 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2933 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2935 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2936 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2939 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2940 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2942 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2947 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2948 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2949 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2952 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2954 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2955 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2956 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2957 if (rc || addr_only)
2960 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2963 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2964 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2967 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2968 unsigned long reqprot,
2973 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2977 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2980 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2981 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2983 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2984 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2985 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2987 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2988 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2989 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2990 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2991 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2993 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2994 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2995 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2996 * modified content. This typically should only
2997 * occur for text relocations.
2999 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3007 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3010 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3012 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3015 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3022 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3027 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3028 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3037 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3038 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3043 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3048 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3052 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3059 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3061 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3062 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3064 tsec = current->security;
3065 fsec = file->f_security;
3066 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3071 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3072 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3076 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3077 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3079 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3080 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3082 tsec = tsk->security;
3083 fsec = file->f_security;
3086 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3088 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3090 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3091 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3094 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3096 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3099 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3101 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3102 struct inode *inode;
3103 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3104 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3105 fsec = file->f_security;
3106 isec = inode->i_security;
3108 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3109 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3110 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3111 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3112 * struct as its SID.
3114 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3115 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3117 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3118 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3119 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3120 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3121 * new inode label or new policy.
3122 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3124 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3127 /* task security operations */
3129 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3133 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3137 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3140 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3142 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3145 tsec1 = current->security;
3147 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3150 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3152 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3153 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3155 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3156 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3157 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3158 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3159 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3164 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3166 task_free_security(tsk);
3169 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3171 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3172 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3173 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3174 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3175 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3180 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3182 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3185 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3187 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3191 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3193 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3196 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3198 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3201 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3203 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3206 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3208 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3212 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3214 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3218 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3222 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3226 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3229 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3233 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3237 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3240 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3242 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3245 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3247 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3250 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3254 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3255 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3256 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3257 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3258 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3259 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3264 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3268 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3272 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3275 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3277 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3280 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3282 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3285 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3290 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3292 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3297 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3299 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3302 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3304 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3308 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3315 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3316 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3317 the state of the current process. */
3318 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3321 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3323 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3326 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3328 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3330 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3333 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3334 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3338 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3339 struct inode *inode)
3341 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3342 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3344 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3345 isec->initialized = 1;
3349 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3350 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3351 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3353 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3354 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3356 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3357 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3361 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3362 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3365 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3366 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3370 *proto = ih->protocol;
3372 switch (ih->protocol) {
3374 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3376 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3380 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3384 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3385 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3390 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3392 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3396 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3400 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3401 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3405 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3406 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3408 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3412 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3416 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3417 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3428 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3430 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3431 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3432 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3435 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3436 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3438 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3439 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3443 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3444 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3447 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3448 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3449 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3458 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3460 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3464 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3470 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3472 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3476 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3477 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3481 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3482 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3484 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3488 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3489 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3493 /* includes fragments */
3503 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3504 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3508 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3510 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3513 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3514 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3517 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3519 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3522 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3523 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3532 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3533 " unable to parse packet\n");
3539 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3541 * @family: protocol family
3542 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3545 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3546 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3547 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3548 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3549 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3553 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3560 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3561 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3563 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3564 if (unlikely(err)) {
3566 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3567 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3574 /* socket security operations */
3575 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3578 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3579 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3580 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3583 tsec = task->security;
3584 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3586 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3589 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3590 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3591 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3597 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3598 int protocol, int kern)
3601 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3607 tsec = current->security;
3608 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3609 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3610 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3611 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3617 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3618 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3621 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3622 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3623 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3626 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3628 tsec = current->security;
3629 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3630 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3631 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3632 isec->initialized = 1;
3635 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3636 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3637 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3638 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3644 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3645 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3646 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3648 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3653 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3658 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3659 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3660 * check the first address now.
3662 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3663 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3666 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3667 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3668 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3669 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3670 unsigned short snum;
3671 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3674 tsec = current->security;
3675 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3677 if (family == PF_INET) {
3678 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3679 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3680 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3682 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3683 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3684 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3690 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3692 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3693 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3697 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3698 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3699 ad.u.net.family = family;
3700 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3702 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3708 switch (isec->sclass) {
3709 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3710 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3713 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3714 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3717 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3718 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3722 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3726 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3730 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3731 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3732 ad.u.net.family = family;
3734 if (family == PF_INET)
3735 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3737 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3739 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3740 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3748 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3750 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3753 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3758 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3760 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3761 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3762 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3763 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3764 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3765 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3766 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3767 unsigned short snum;
3770 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3771 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3772 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3774 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3776 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3777 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3779 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3782 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3786 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3787 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3789 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3790 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3791 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3792 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3801 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3803 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3806 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3809 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3810 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3812 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3816 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3818 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3819 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3820 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3821 newisec->initialized = 1;
3826 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3831 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3835 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3838 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3839 int size, int flags)
3841 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3844 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3846 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3849 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3851 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3854 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3858 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3862 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3865 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3868 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3871 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3873 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3876 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3877 struct socket *other,
3880 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3881 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3882 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3883 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3886 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3890 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3891 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3893 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3894 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3896 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3898 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3902 /* connecting socket */
3903 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3904 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3906 /* server child socket */
3907 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3908 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3909 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3914 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3915 struct socket *other)
3917 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3918 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3919 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3922 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3923 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3925 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3926 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3928 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3929 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3936 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3938 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3944 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3947 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3948 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3952 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3955 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3956 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3959 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3960 struct sk_buff *skb,
3961 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3966 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3968 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
3969 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
3971 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
3972 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
3975 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3976 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3977 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3978 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3980 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3981 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3982 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3983 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3985 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3986 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3987 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3988 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3991 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3992 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3997 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4000 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4004 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4007 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4013 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4014 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4015 if (unlikely(err)) {
4017 "SELinux: failure in"
4018 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4019 " network port label not found\n");
4022 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4025 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4026 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4027 u16 family, char *addrp)
4030 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4032 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4034 if (selinux_compat_net)
4035 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4038 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4043 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4044 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4047 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4048 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4050 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4053 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4059 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4062 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4063 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4064 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4065 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4068 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4071 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4072 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4075 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4076 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4077 ad.u.net.family = family;
4078 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4082 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4083 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4084 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4085 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4086 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4087 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4090 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4093 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4096 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4100 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4104 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4105 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4114 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4115 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4120 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4121 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4122 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4124 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4126 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4127 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4128 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4129 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4131 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4136 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4141 if (scontext_len > len) {
4146 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4150 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4158 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4160 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4164 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4165 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4166 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4170 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4171 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4173 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4176 *secid = peer_secid;
4177 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4182 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4184 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4187 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4189 sk_free_security(sk);
4192 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4194 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4195 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4197 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4198 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4199 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4201 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4204 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4207 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4209 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4211 *secid = sksec->sid;
4215 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4217 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4218 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4220 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4221 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4222 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4223 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4225 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4228 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4229 struct request_sock *req)
4231 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4236 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4239 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4240 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4241 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4245 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4249 req->secid = newsid;
4250 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4254 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4255 const struct request_sock *req)
4257 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4259 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4260 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4261 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4262 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4263 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4264 time it will have been created and available. */
4266 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4267 * thread with access to newsksec */
4268 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4271 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4272 struct sk_buff *skb)
4274 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4276 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4279 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4282 fl->secid = req->secid;
4285 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4289 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4290 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4291 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4293 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4297 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4299 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4301 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4302 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4303 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4304 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4305 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4306 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4316 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4321 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4323 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4328 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4332 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4335 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4336 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4337 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4340 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4341 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4342 ad.u.net.family = family;
4343 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4346 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4350 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4351 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4355 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4356 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4362 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4363 struct sk_buff *skb,
4364 const struct net_device *in,
4365 const struct net_device *out,
4366 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4368 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4371 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4372 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4373 struct sk_buff *skb,
4374 const struct net_device *in,
4375 const struct net_device *out,
4376 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4378 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4382 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4384 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4385 u16 family, char *addrp)
4388 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4390 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4391 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4393 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4394 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4397 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4398 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4399 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4400 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4402 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4403 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4404 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4405 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4407 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4408 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4409 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4410 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4413 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4414 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4419 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4422 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4425 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4428 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4435 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4436 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4437 if (unlikely(err)) {
4439 "SELinux: failure in"
4440 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4441 " network port label not found\n");
4444 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4447 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4449 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4454 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4455 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4459 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4461 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4462 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4466 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4467 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4471 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4472 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4478 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4484 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4490 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4491 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4492 ad.u.net.family = family;
4493 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4496 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4497 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4498 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4499 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4500 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4501 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4502 family, addrp, proto);
4504 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4505 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4506 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4507 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4508 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4509 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4510 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4513 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4514 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4515 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4518 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4519 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4520 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4521 * directly from the packet */
4524 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4525 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4526 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4528 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4530 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4534 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4535 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4538 if (peerlbl_active) {
4542 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4544 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4545 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4548 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4550 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4551 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4558 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4559 struct sk_buff *skb,
4560 const struct net_device *in,
4561 const struct net_device *out,
4562 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4564 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4567 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4568 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4569 struct sk_buff *skb,
4570 const struct net_device *in,
4571 const struct net_device *out,
4572 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4574 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4578 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4580 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4584 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4588 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4589 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4594 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4597 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4599 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4603 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4604 ad.u.cap = capability;
4606 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4607 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4610 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4611 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4614 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4615 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4617 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4621 isec->sclass = sclass;
4622 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4623 perm->security = isec;
4628 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4630 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4631 perm->security = NULL;
4635 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4637 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4639 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4643 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4644 msg->security = msec;
4649 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4651 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4653 msg->security = NULL;
4657 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4660 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4661 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4662 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4664 tsec = current->security;
4665 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4667 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4668 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4670 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4673 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4675 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4678 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4680 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4683 /* message queue security operations */
4684 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4686 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4687 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4688 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4691 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4695 tsec = current->security;
4696 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4698 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4699 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4701 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4704 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4710 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4712 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4715 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4717 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4718 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4719 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4721 tsec = current->security;
4722 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4724 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4725 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4727 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4728 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4731 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4739 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4740 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4743 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4746 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4749 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4755 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4759 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4761 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4762 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4763 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4764 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4767 tsec = current->security;
4768 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4769 msec = msg->security;
4772 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4774 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4776 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4777 * message queue this message will be stored in
4779 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4787 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4788 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4790 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4791 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4794 /* Can this process send the message */
4795 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4796 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4798 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4799 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4800 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4805 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4806 struct task_struct *target,
4807 long type, int mode)
4809 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4810 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4811 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4812 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4815 tsec = target->security;
4816 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4817 msec = msg->security;
4819 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4820 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4822 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4823 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4825 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4826 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4830 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4831 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4833 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4834 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4835 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4838 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4842 tsec = current->security;
4843 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4845 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4846 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4848 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4851 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4857 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4859 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4862 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4864 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4865 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4866 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4868 tsec = current->security;
4869 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4871 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4872 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4874 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4875 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4878 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4879 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4887 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4888 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4891 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4894 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4901 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4907 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4911 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4912 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4917 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4921 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4924 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4926 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4929 /* Semaphore security operations */
4930 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4932 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4933 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4934 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4937 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4941 tsec = current->security;
4942 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4944 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4945 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4947 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4950 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4956 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4958 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4961 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4963 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4964 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4965 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4967 tsec = current->security;
4968 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4970 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4971 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4973 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4974 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4977 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4978 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4986 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4987 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4991 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5002 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5005 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5009 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5015 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5019 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5020 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5025 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5029 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5032 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5038 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5040 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5045 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5048 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5050 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5054 /* module stacking operations */
5055 static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
5057 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
5058 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
5059 "module registered.\n", __func__);
5063 secondary_ops = ops;
5065 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
5072 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5075 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5078 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5079 char *name, char **value)
5081 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5087 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5094 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5096 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5098 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5099 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5100 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5101 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5102 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5103 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5104 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5105 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5112 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5118 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5119 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5121 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5122 struct task_struct *tracer;
5128 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5129 security attributes. */
5134 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5135 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5136 * above restriction is ever removed.
5138 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5139 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5140 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5141 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5142 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5143 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5144 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5145 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5146 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5147 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5153 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5154 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5155 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5159 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5160 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5161 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5163 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5170 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5171 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5172 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5173 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5174 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5175 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5177 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5178 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5179 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5180 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5181 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5182 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5185 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5186 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5187 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5188 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5189 struct av_decision avd;
5194 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5195 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5196 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5197 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5198 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5199 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5200 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5201 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5204 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5205 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5208 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5209 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5210 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5214 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5215 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5218 tracer = task_tracer_task(p);
5219 if (tracer != NULL) {
5220 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5221 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5223 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5225 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5229 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5230 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5244 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5246 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5249 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5251 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5254 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5261 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5262 unsigned long flags)
5264 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5265 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5267 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5271 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5272 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5274 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5280 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5282 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5288 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5289 struct task_struct *ctx,
5293 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5294 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5296 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5298 tsec = ctx->security;
5299 ksec = key->security;
5301 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5302 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5303 appear to be created. */
5307 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5308 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5311 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5313 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5314 char *context = NULL;
5318 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5327 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5330 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5331 .capget = selinux_capget,
5332 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5333 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5334 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5335 .capable = selinux_capable,
5336 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5337 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5338 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5339 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5341 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5342 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5344 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5345 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5346 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5347 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5348 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5349 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5350 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5352 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5353 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5354 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5355 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5356 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5357 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5358 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5359 .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
5360 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5361 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5362 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5365 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5366 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5367 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5368 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5369 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5370 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5371 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5372 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5373 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5374 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5375 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5376 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5377 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5378 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5379 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5380 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5381 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5382 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5383 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5384 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5385 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5386 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5387 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5388 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5389 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5390 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5391 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5393 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5394 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5395 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5396 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5397 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5398 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5399 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5400 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5401 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5402 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5403 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5405 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5407 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5408 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5409 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5410 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5411 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5412 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5413 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5414 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5415 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5416 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5417 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5418 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5419 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5420 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5421 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5422 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5423 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5424 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5425 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5426 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5427 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5428 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5429 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5431 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5432 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5434 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5435 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5437 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5438 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5439 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5440 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5441 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5442 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5444 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5445 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5446 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5447 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5448 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5450 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5451 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5452 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5453 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5454 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5456 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
5458 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5460 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5461 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5463 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5464 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5465 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5467 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5468 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5470 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5471 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5472 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5473 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5474 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5475 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5476 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5477 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5478 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5479 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5480 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5481 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5482 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5483 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5484 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5485 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5486 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5487 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5488 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5489 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5490 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5491 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5492 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5493 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5494 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5496 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5497 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5498 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5499 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5500 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5501 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5502 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5503 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5504 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5505 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5506 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5510 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5511 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5512 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5513 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5517 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5518 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5519 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5520 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5524 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5526 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5528 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5529 selinux_enabled = 0;
5533 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5534 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5538 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5540 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5541 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5542 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5543 tsec = current->security;
5544 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5546 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5547 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5548 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5551 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5553 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5554 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5555 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5557 if (selinux_enforcing)
5558 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5560 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5565 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5567 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5569 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5570 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5571 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5572 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5574 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5575 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5576 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5577 struct superblock_security_struct,
5579 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5581 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5582 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5583 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5585 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5587 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5588 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5589 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5592 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5593 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5596 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5597 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5598 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5600 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5602 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5604 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5605 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5607 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5608 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5611 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5612 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5614 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5615 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5619 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5621 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5623 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5624 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5626 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5627 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5630 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5631 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5633 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5634 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5640 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5645 if (!selinux_enabled)
5648 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5650 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) {
5651 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5653 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n",
5657 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5658 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) {
5659 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5661 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n",
5670 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5672 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5673 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5677 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5679 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++)
5680 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5681 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5682 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++)
5683 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5688 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5690 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5691 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5694 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5696 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5697 static int selinux_disabled;
5699 int selinux_disable(void)
5701 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5703 if (ss_initialized) {
5704 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5708 if (selinux_disabled) {
5709 /* Only do this once. */
5713 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5715 selinux_disabled = 1;
5716 selinux_enabled = 0;
5718 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5719 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5721 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5722 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5724 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */