1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
33 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
35 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
36 * filesystem information.
38 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
39 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
42 #include <linux/init.h>
43 #include <asm/types.h>
44 #include <asm/atomic.h>
45 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
49 #include <linux/module.h>
50 #include <linux/mount.h>
51 #include <linux/socket.h>
52 #include <linux/audit.h>
53 #include <linux/personality.h>
54 #include <linux/time.h>
55 #include <linux/netlink.h>
56 #include <linux/compiler.h>
57 #include <asm/unistd.h>
58 #include <linux/security.h>
59 #include <linux/list.h>
60 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
66 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
67 extern int audit_enabled;
69 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
70 * for saving names from getname(). */
71 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
73 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
74 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
76 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
78 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
79 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
80 * pointers at syscall exit time).
82 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
95 struct audit_aux_data {
96 struct audit_aux_data *next;
100 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
102 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
103 struct audit_aux_data d;
105 unsigned long qbytes;
112 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
113 struct audit_aux_data d;
115 unsigned long args[0];
118 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
119 struct audit_aux_data d;
124 struct audit_aux_data_path {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
126 struct dentry *dentry;
127 struct vfsmount *mnt;
130 /* The per-task audit context. */
131 struct audit_context {
132 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
133 enum audit_state state;
134 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
135 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
136 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
137 int major; /* syscall number */
138 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
139 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
140 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
141 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
143 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
145 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
146 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
147 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
149 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
151 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
152 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
153 unsigned long personality;
163 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
165 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
166 struct audit_krule *rule,
167 struct audit_context *ctx,
168 enum audit_state *state)
172 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
173 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
178 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
181 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
184 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
187 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
190 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
193 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
196 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
199 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
202 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
205 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
209 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
213 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
214 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
217 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
219 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
221 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
226 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
227 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
236 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
237 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
246 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
247 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
248 audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
258 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
265 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
272 switch (rule->action) {
273 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
274 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
275 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
280 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
281 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
282 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
284 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
286 struct audit_entry *e;
287 enum audit_state state;
290 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
291 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
297 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
300 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
301 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
302 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
303 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
305 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
306 struct audit_context *ctx,
307 struct list_head *list)
309 struct audit_entry *e;
310 enum audit_state state;
312 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
313 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
316 if (!list_empty(list)) {
317 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
318 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
320 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
321 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
322 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
329 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
332 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
333 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
337 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
339 if (likely(!context))
341 context->return_valid = return_valid;
342 context->return_code = return_code;
344 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
345 enum audit_state state;
346 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
347 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
348 context->auditable = 1;
351 context->pid = tsk->pid;
352 context->uid = tsk->uid;
353 context->gid = tsk->gid;
354 context->euid = tsk->euid;
355 context->suid = tsk->suid;
356 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
357 context->egid = tsk->egid;
358 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
359 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
360 context->personality = tsk->personality;
361 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
365 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
370 if (context->auditable
371 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
372 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
373 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
374 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
376 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
377 context->name_count, context->put_count,
379 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
380 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
381 context->names[i].name,
382 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
389 context->put_count = 0;
390 context->ino_count = 0;
393 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
394 char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
395 context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
397 if (context->names[i].name)
398 __putname(context->names[i].name);
400 context->name_count = 0;
404 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
406 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
409 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
411 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
413 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
414 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
415 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
419 if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
420 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
425 context->aux = aux->next;
430 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
431 enum audit_state state)
433 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
435 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
436 context->state = state;
437 context->loginuid = loginuid;
440 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
442 struct audit_context *context;
444 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
446 audit_zero_context(context, state);
451 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
454 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
455 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
456 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
459 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
461 struct audit_context *context;
462 enum audit_state state;
464 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
465 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
467 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
468 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
471 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
472 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
476 /* Preserve login uid */
477 context->loginuid = -1;
478 if (current->audit_context)
479 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
481 tsk->audit_context = context;
482 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
486 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
488 struct audit_context *previous;
492 previous = context->previous;
493 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
495 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
496 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
497 context->serial, context->major,
498 context->name_count, count);
500 audit_free_names(context);
501 audit_free_aux(context);
506 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
509 static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
514 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
521 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
525 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
529 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
535 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
539 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
541 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
542 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
543 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
547 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
548 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
549 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
552 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
555 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
557 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
558 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
559 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
564 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
566 audit_log_task_context(ab);
569 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
572 struct audit_buffer *ab;
573 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
578 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
580 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
581 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
582 context->arch, context->major);
583 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
584 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
585 if (context->return_valid)
586 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
587 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
588 context->return_code);
589 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
590 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
594 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
595 " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
596 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
597 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
607 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
608 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
609 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
612 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
614 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
616 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
620 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
622 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
623 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
626 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
628 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
629 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
630 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
631 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
634 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
635 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
637 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
638 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
641 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
642 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
643 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
650 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
651 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
653 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
657 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
658 unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
659 unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
661 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
663 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
665 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
667 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
668 if (context->names[i].name)
669 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
671 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
673 if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
674 audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
675 if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
676 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
677 if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
678 audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
679 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
680 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
681 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
682 context->names[i].mode,
683 context->names[i].uid,
684 context->names[i].gid,
685 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
686 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
687 if (context->names[i].ctx) {
688 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
689 context->names[i].ctx);
697 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
698 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
700 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
702 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
704 struct audit_context *context;
706 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
707 if (likely(!context))
710 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
711 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
712 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
713 * in the context of the idle thread */
714 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
715 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
716 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
718 audit_free_context(context);
722 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
723 * @tsk: task being audited
724 * @arch: architecture type
725 * @major: major syscall type (function)
726 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
727 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
728 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
729 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
731 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
732 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
733 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
734 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
735 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
736 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
739 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
740 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
741 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
743 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
744 enum audit_state state;
749 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
750 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
751 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
752 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
753 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
757 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
759 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
760 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
762 if (context->in_syscall) {
763 struct audit_context *newctx;
767 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
768 " entering syscall=%d\n",
769 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
771 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
773 newctx->previous = context;
775 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
777 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
778 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
779 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
780 * to abandon auditing. */
781 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
784 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
789 context->arch = arch;
790 context->major = major;
791 context->argv[0] = a1;
792 context->argv[1] = a2;
793 context->argv[2] = a3;
794 context->argv[3] = a4;
796 state = context->state;
797 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
798 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
799 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
803 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
804 context->in_syscall = 1;
805 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
809 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
810 * @tsk: task being audited
811 * @valid: success/failure flag
812 * @return_code: syscall return value
814 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
815 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
816 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
817 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
818 * free the names stored from getname().
820 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
822 struct audit_context *context;
826 get_task_struct(tsk);
828 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
831 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
832 * called __put_task_struct. */
833 if (likely(!context))
836 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
837 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
839 context->in_syscall = 0;
840 context->auditable = 0;
842 if (context->previous) {
843 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
844 context->previous = NULL;
845 audit_free_context(context);
846 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
848 audit_free_names(context);
849 audit_free_aux(context);
850 tsk->audit_context = context;
853 put_task_struct(tsk);
857 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
860 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
861 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
863 void audit_getname(const char *name)
865 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
867 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
870 if (!context->in_syscall) {
872 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
873 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
878 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
879 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
880 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
881 ++context->name_count;
883 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
884 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
885 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
886 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
891 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
892 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
894 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
895 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
896 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
898 void audit_putname(const char *name)
900 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
903 if (!context->in_syscall) {
905 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
906 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
907 if (context->name_count) {
909 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
910 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
911 context->names[i].name,
912 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
919 ++context->put_count;
920 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
921 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
922 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
925 context->serial, context->major,
926 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
934 void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
936 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
937 const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
944 len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
945 if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
950 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
954 len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
958 kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
959 context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
965 audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
972 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
973 * @name: name being audited
974 * @inode: inode being audited
975 * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
977 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
979 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
982 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
984 if (!context->in_syscall)
986 if (context->name_count
987 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
988 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
989 idx = context->name_count - 1;
990 else if (context->name_count > 1
991 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
992 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
993 idx = context->name_count - 2;
995 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
996 * associated name? */
997 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
999 idx = context->name_count++;
1000 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1002 ++context->ino_count;
1005 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1006 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1007 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1008 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1009 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1010 audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
1011 if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
1012 (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
1013 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1014 context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
1016 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1017 context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
1022 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1023 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1024 * @inode: inode being audited
1025 * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
1027 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1028 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1029 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1030 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1031 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1032 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1033 * unsuccessful attempts.
1035 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1039 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1041 if (!context->in_syscall)
1044 /* determine matching parent */
1046 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
1047 if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
1049 const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
1050 int dlen = strlen(dname);
1051 int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
1056 /* disregard trailing slashes */
1057 n = name + nlen - 1;
1058 while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
1061 /* find last path component */
1065 else if (n > name) {
1072 if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
1073 goto update_context;
1076 /* catch-all in case match not found */
1077 idx = context->name_count++;
1078 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1079 context->names[idx].pino = pino;
1081 context->ino_count++;
1086 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1087 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1088 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1089 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1090 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1091 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1092 audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
1097 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1098 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1099 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1100 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1102 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1104 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1105 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1108 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1109 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1110 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1111 *serial = ctx->serial;
1116 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1117 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1118 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1122 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1124 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1126 if (task->audit_context) {
1127 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1129 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1131 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1132 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1133 task->pid, task->uid,
1134 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1137 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1143 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1144 * @ctx: the audit_context
1146 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1148 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1150 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1153 static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1155 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1159 if (likely(!context))
1162 len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
1163 if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
1168 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1172 len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
1180 audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
1186 * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
1187 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1188 * @uid: msgq user id
1189 * @gid: msgq group id
1190 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1192 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1194 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1196 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1197 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1199 if (likely(!context))
1202 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1206 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1210 ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
1212 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1213 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1214 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1219 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1220 * @nargs: number of args
1223 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1225 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1227 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1228 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1230 if (likely(!context))
1233 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1238 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1240 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1241 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1242 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1247 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1248 * @len: data length in user space
1249 * @a: data address in kernel space
1251 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1253 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1255 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1256 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1258 if (likely(!context))
1261 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1266 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1268 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1269 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1270 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1275 * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
1276 * @dentry: dentry to record
1277 * @mnt: mnt to record
1279 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1281 * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
1283 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1285 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1286 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1288 if (likely(!context))
1291 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1295 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1296 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1298 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1299 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1300 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1305 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1306 * @sig: signal value
1307 * @t: task being signaled
1309 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1310 * and uid that is doing that.
1312 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1314 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1315 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1317 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
1318 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1319 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1320 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1322 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1324 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;