1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
21 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
23 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
24 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
26 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
27 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
28 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 #include <linux/init.h>
33 #include <asm/atomic.h>
34 #include <asm/types.h>
36 #include <linux/module.h>
37 #include <linux/mount.h>
38 #include <linux/socket.h>
39 #include <linux/audit.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/time.h>
42 #include <linux/kthread.h>
43 #include <linux/netlink.h>
44 #include <linux/compiler.h>
45 #include <asm/unistd.h>
48 1 = put_count checking
49 2 = verbose put_count checking
53 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
54 extern int audit_enabled;
56 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
57 * for saving names from getname(). */
58 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
60 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
61 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
63 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
65 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
66 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
67 the syscall filter. */
69 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
70 * No syscall-specific audit records can
72 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
73 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
74 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
76 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
77 * and always fill it in at syscall
78 * entry time. This makes a full
79 * syscall record available if some
80 * other part of the kernel decides it
81 * should be recorded. */
82 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
83 * always fill it in at syscall entry
84 * time, and always write out the audit
85 * record at syscall exit time. */
88 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
89 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
90 * pointers at syscall exit time).
92 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
104 struct audit_aux_data {
105 struct audit_aux_data *next;
109 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
111 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
112 struct audit_aux_data d;
114 unsigned long qbytes;
120 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
121 struct audit_aux_data d;
123 unsigned long args[0];
126 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
127 struct audit_aux_data d;
132 struct audit_aux_data_path {
133 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 struct dentry *dentry;
135 struct vfsmount *mnt;
138 /* The per-task audit context. */
139 struct audit_context {
140 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
141 enum audit_state state;
142 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
143 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
144 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
145 int major; /* syscall number */
146 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
147 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
148 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
149 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
151 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
153 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
154 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
155 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
157 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
159 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
160 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
161 unsigned long personality;
171 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
172 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
173 * syscall exit time. */
174 static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
175 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
176 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
177 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
178 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
179 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
180 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
181 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
186 struct list_head list;
188 struct audit_rule rule;
191 extern int audit_pid;
193 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
194 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
195 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
199 if (a->flags != b->flags)
202 if (a->action != b->action)
205 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
208 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
209 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
210 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
214 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
215 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
221 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
222 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
223 * audit_netlink_sem. */
224 static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
225 struct list_head *list)
227 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
228 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
229 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
231 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
235 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
237 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
241 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
242 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
243 * audit_netlink_sem. */
244 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
245 struct list_head *list)
247 struct audit_entry *e;
249 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
250 * deletion routine. */
251 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
252 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
253 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
254 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
258 return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
261 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
263 static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
267 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
268 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
269 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
271 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
273 if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
277 d->action = s->action;
278 d->field_count = s->field_count;
279 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
280 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
281 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
283 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
287 static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
291 struct audit_entry *entry;
298 down(&audit_netlink_sem);
300 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
301 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
302 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
303 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
304 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
305 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
307 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
309 up(&audit_netlink_sem);
313 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
316 struct audit_entry *entry;
317 struct task_struct *tsk;
324 /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
325 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
326 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
327 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
328 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
330 dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
336 tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
343 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
345 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
349 listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
350 audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
351 audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
352 "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
355 listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
356 if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
359 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
361 audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
362 "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
371 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
373 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
374 struct audit_rule *rule,
375 struct audit_context *ctx,
376 enum audit_state *state)
380 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
381 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
382 u32 value = rule->values[i];
387 result = (tsk->pid == value);
390 result = (tsk->uid == value);
393 result = (tsk->euid == value);
396 result = (tsk->suid == value);
399 result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
402 result = (tsk->gid == value);
405 result = (tsk->egid == value);
408 result = (tsk->sgid == value);
411 result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
414 result = (tsk->personality == value);
418 result = (ctx->arch == value);
422 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
423 result = (ctx->return_code == value);
426 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
427 result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
431 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
432 if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
441 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
442 if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
451 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
452 if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
462 result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
469 result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
473 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
478 switch (rule->action) {
479 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
480 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
481 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
486 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
487 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
488 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
490 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
492 struct audit_entry *e;
493 enum audit_state state;
496 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
497 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
503 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
506 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
507 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
508 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
509 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
511 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
512 struct audit_context *ctx,
513 struct list_head *list)
515 struct audit_entry *e;
516 enum audit_state state;
518 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
519 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
522 if (!list_empty(list)) {
523 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
524 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
526 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
527 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
528 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
535 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
538 static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
539 struct audit_rule *rule,
540 enum audit_state *state)
544 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
545 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
546 u32 value = rule->values[i];
551 result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
554 result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
557 result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
560 result = (cb->loginuid == value);
564 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
569 switch (rule->action) {
570 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
571 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
572 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
577 int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
579 struct audit_entry *e;
580 enum audit_state state;
584 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
585 if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
586 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
593 return ret; /* Audit by default */
596 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
597 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
601 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
603 if (likely(!context))
605 context->return_valid = return_valid;
606 context->return_code = return_code;
608 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
609 enum audit_state state;
610 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
611 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
612 context->auditable = 1;
615 context->pid = tsk->pid;
616 context->uid = tsk->uid;
617 context->gid = tsk->gid;
618 context->euid = tsk->euid;
619 context->suid = tsk->suid;
620 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
621 context->egid = tsk->egid;
622 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
623 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
624 context->personality = tsk->personality;
625 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
629 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
634 if (context->auditable
635 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
636 printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
637 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
638 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
640 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
641 context->name_count, context->put_count,
643 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
644 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
645 context->names[i].name,
646 context->names[i].name);
652 context->put_count = 0;
653 context->ino_count = 0;
656 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
657 if (context->names[i].name)
658 __putname(context->names[i].name);
659 context->name_count = 0;
663 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
665 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
668 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
670 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
672 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
673 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
674 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
678 context->aux = aux->next;
683 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
684 enum audit_state state)
686 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
688 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
689 context->state = state;
690 context->loginuid = loginuid;
693 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
695 struct audit_context *context;
697 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
699 audit_zero_context(context, state);
703 /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
704 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
705 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
707 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
709 struct audit_context *context;
710 enum audit_state state;
712 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
713 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
715 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
716 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
719 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
720 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
724 /* Preserve login uid */
725 context->loginuid = -1;
726 if (current->audit_context)
727 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
729 tsk->audit_context = context;
730 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
734 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
736 struct audit_context *previous;
740 previous = context->previous;
741 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
743 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
744 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
745 context->serial, context->major,
746 context->name_count, count);
748 audit_free_names(context);
749 audit_free_aux(context);
754 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
757 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
759 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
760 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
761 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
763 get_task_comm(name, current);
764 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
765 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
770 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
773 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
775 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
776 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
777 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
782 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
785 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, unsigned int gfp_mask)
788 struct audit_buffer *ab;
789 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
791 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
793 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
794 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
795 context->arch, context->major);
796 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
797 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
798 if (context->return_valid)
799 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
800 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
801 context->return_code);
803 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
804 " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
805 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
806 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
816 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
817 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
818 audit_log_task_info(ab);
821 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
823 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
825 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
829 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
831 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
832 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
835 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
837 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
838 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
839 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
840 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
843 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
844 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
846 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
847 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
850 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
851 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
852 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
859 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
860 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
862 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
866 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
867 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
869 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
871 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
872 if (context->names[i].name) {
873 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
874 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
876 audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
878 if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
879 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
880 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
881 context->names[i].ino,
882 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
883 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
884 context->names[i].mode,
885 context->names[i].uid,
886 context->names[i].gid,
887 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
888 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
893 /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
894 * __put_task_struct. */
895 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
897 struct audit_context *context;
900 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
903 if (likely(!context))
906 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
907 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
908 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
909 * in the context of the idle thread */
910 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
911 audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
913 audit_free_context(context);
916 /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
917 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
918 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
919 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
920 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
921 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
923 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
924 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
925 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
927 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
928 enum audit_state state;
932 /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
933 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
934 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
935 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
936 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
940 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
942 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
943 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
945 if (context->in_syscall) {
946 struct audit_context *newctx;
948 #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
949 /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
950 if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
955 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
956 " entering syscall=%d\n",
957 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
959 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
961 newctx->previous = context;
963 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
965 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
966 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
967 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
968 * to abandon auditing. */
969 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
972 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
977 context->arch = arch;
978 context->major = major;
979 context->argv[0] = a1;
980 context->argv[1] = a2;
981 context->argv[2] = a3;
982 context->argv[3] = a4;
984 state = context->state;
985 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
986 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
987 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
991 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
992 context->in_syscall = 1;
993 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
996 /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
997 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
998 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
999 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1000 * free the names stored from getname(). */
1001 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
1003 struct audit_context *context;
1005 get_task_struct(tsk);
1007 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1010 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
1011 * called __put_task_struct. */
1012 if (likely(!context))
1015 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1016 audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
1018 context->in_syscall = 0;
1019 context->auditable = 0;
1021 if (context->previous) {
1022 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1023 context->previous = NULL;
1024 audit_free_context(context);
1025 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1027 audit_free_names(context);
1028 audit_free_aux(context);
1029 tsk->audit_context = context;
1032 put_task_struct(tsk);
1035 /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
1036 void audit_getname(const char *name)
1038 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1040 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1043 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1044 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1045 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1046 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1051 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1052 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1053 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1054 ++context->name_count;
1055 if (!context->pwd) {
1056 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1057 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1058 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1059 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1064 /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
1065 * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
1066 * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
1068 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1070 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1073 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1074 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1075 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1076 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1077 if (context->name_count) {
1079 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1080 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1081 context->names[i].name,
1082 context->names[i].name);
1089 ++context->put_count;
1090 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1091 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1092 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1095 context->serial, context->major,
1096 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1097 context->put_count);
1104 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
1105 * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
1106 void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
1109 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1111 if (!context->in_syscall)
1113 if (context->name_count
1114 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1115 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1116 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1117 else if (context->name_count > 1
1118 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1119 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1120 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1122 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1123 * associated name? */
1124 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1126 idx = context->name_count++;
1127 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1129 ++context->ino_count;
1132 context->names[idx].flags = flags;
1133 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1134 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1135 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1136 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1137 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1138 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1141 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1142 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1145 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1146 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1147 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1148 *serial = ctx->serial;
1152 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1154 if (task->audit_context) {
1155 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1157 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1159 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1160 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1161 task->pid, task->uid,
1162 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1165 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1170 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1172 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1175 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1177 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1178 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1180 if (likely(!context))
1183 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1187 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1192 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1193 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1194 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1198 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1200 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1201 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1203 if (likely(!context))
1206 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1211 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1213 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1214 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1215 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1219 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1221 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1222 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1224 if (likely(!context))
1227 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1232 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1234 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1235 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1236 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1240 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1242 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1243 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1245 if (likely(!context))
1248 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1252 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1253 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1255 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1256 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1257 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1261 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1263 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1264 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1266 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
1267 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1268 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1269 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1271 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1273 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;