1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
21 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
23 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
24 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
26 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
27 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
28 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 #include <linux/init.h>
33 #include <asm/atomic.h>
34 #include <asm/types.h>
36 #include <linux/module.h>
37 #include <linux/mount.h>
38 #include <linux/socket.h>
39 #include <linux/audit.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/time.h>
42 #include <linux/kthread.h>
43 #include <asm/unistd.h>
46 1 = put_count checking
47 2 = verbose put_count checking
51 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
52 extern int audit_enabled;
54 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
55 * for saving names from getname(). */
56 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
58 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
59 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
61 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
63 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
64 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
65 the syscall filter. */
67 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
68 * No syscall-specific audit records can
70 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
71 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
72 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
74 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
75 * and always fill it in at syscall
76 * entry time. This makes a full
77 * syscall record available if some
78 * other part of the kernel decides it
79 * should be recorded. */
80 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
81 * always fill it in at syscall entry
82 * time, and always write out the audit
83 * record at syscall exit time. */
86 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
87 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
88 * pointers at syscall exit time).
90 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
102 struct audit_aux_data {
103 struct audit_aux_data *next;
107 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
109 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
110 struct audit_aux_data d;
112 unsigned long qbytes;
118 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
119 struct audit_aux_data d;
121 unsigned long args[0];
124 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 struct audit_aux_data_path {
131 struct audit_aux_data d;
132 struct dentry *dentry;
133 struct vfsmount *mnt;
136 /* The per-task audit context. */
137 struct audit_context {
138 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
139 enum audit_state state;
140 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
141 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
142 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
143 int major; /* syscall number */
144 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
145 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
146 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
147 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
149 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
151 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
152 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
153 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
155 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
157 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
158 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
159 unsigned long personality;
169 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
170 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
171 * syscall exit time. */
172 static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
173 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
174 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
175 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
176 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
177 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
178 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
179 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
184 struct list_head list;
186 struct audit_rule rule;
189 extern int audit_pid;
191 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
192 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
193 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
197 if (a->flags != b->flags)
200 if (a->action != b->action)
203 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
206 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
207 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
208 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
212 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
213 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
219 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
220 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
221 * audit_netlink_sem. */
222 static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
223 struct list_head *list)
225 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
226 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
227 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
229 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
233 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
235 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
239 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
240 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
241 * audit_netlink_sem. */
242 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
243 struct list_head *list)
245 struct audit_entry *e;
247 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
248 * deletion routine. */
249 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
250 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
251 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
252 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
256 return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
259 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
261 static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
265 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
266 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
267 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
269 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
271 if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
275 d->action = s->action;
276 d->field_count = s->field_count;
277 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
278 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
279 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
281 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
285 static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
289 struct audit_entry *entry;
296 down(&audit_netlink_sem);
298 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
299 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
300 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
301 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
302 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
303 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
305 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
307 up(&audit_netlink_sem);
311 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
314 struct audit_entry *entry;
315 struct task_struct *tsk;
322 /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
323 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
324 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
325 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
326 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
328 dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
334 tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
341 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
343 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
347 listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
348 audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
349 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
350 "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
353 listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
354 if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
357 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
359 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
360 "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
369 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
371 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
372 struct audit_rule *rule,
373 struct audit_context *ctx,
374 enum audit_state *state)
378 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
379 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
380 u32 value = rule->values[i];
385 result = (tsk->pid == value);
388 result = (tsk->uid == value);
391 result = (tsk->euid == value);
394 result = (tsk->suid == value);
397 result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
400 result = (tsk->gid == value);
403 result = (tsk->egid == value);
406 result = (tsk->sgid == value);
409 result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
412 result = (tsk->personality == value);
416 result = (ctx->arch == value);
420 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
421 result = (ctx->return_code == value);
424 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
425 result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
429 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
430 if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
439 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
440 if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
449 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
450 if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
460 result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
467 result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
471 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
476 switch (rule->action) {
477 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
478 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
479 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
484 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
485 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
486 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
488 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
490 struct audit_entry *e;
491 enum audit_state state;
494 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
495 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
501 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
504 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
505 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
506 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
507 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
509 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
510 struct audit_context *ctx,
511 struct list_head *list)
513 struct audit_entry *e;
514 enum audit_state state;
515 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
516 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
518 if (audit_pid && ctx->pid == audit_pid)
519 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
522 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
523 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
524 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
530 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
533 int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type)
535 struct task_struct *tsk;
536 struct audit_entry *e;
537 enum audit_state state;
540 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
541 tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid);
543 get_task_struct(tsk);
544 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
550 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
551 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
552 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
558 put_task_struct(tsk);
560 return 1; /* Audit by default */
564 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
565 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
569 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
571 if (likely(!context))
573 context->return_valid = return_valid;
574 context->return_code = return_code;
576 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
577 enum audit_state state;
578 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
579 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
580 context->auditable = 1;
583 context->pid = tsk->pid;
584 context->uid = tsk->uid;
585 context->gid = tsk->gid;
586 context->euid = tsk->euid;
587 context->suid = tsk->suid;
588 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
589 context->egid = tsk->egid;
590 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
591 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
592 context->personality = tsk->personality;
593 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
597 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
602 if (context->auditable
603 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
604 printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
605 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
606 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
608 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
609 context->name_count, context->put_count,
611 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
612 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
613 context->names[i].name,
614 context->names[i].name);
620 context->put_count = 0;
621 context->ino_count = 0;
624 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
625 if (context->names[i].name)
626 __putname(context->names[i].name);
627 context->name_count = 0;
631 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
633 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
636 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
638 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
640 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
641 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
642 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
646 context->aux = aux->next;
651 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
652 enum audit_state state)
654 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
656 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
657 context->state = state;
658 context->loginuid = loginuid;
661 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
663 struct audit_context *context;
665 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
667 audit_zero_context(context, state);
671 /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
672 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
673 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
675 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
677 struct audit_context *context;
678 enum audit_state state;
680 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
681 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
683 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
684 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
687 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
688 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
692 /* Preserve login uid */
693 context->loginuid = -1;
694 if (current->audit_context)
695 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
697 tsk->audit_context = context;
698 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
702 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
704 struct audit_context *previous;
708 previous = context->previous;
709 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
711 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
712 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
713 context->serial, context->major,
714 context->name_count, count);
716 audit_free_names(context);
717 audit_free_aux(context);
722 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
725 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
727 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
728 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
729 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
731 get_task_comm(name, current);
732 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
733 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
738 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
741 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
743 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
744 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
745 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
750 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
753 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
756 struct audit_buffer *ab;
757 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
759 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
761 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
762 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
763 context->arch, context->major);
764 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
765 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
766 if (context->return_valid)
767 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
768 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
769 context->return_code);
771 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
772 " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
773 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
774 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
784 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
785 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
786 audit_log_task_info(ab);
789 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
791 ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type);
793 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
797 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
799 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
800 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
803 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
805 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
806 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
807 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
808 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
811 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
812 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
814 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
815 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
818 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
819 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
820 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
827 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
828 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_CWD);
830 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
834 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
835 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH);
837 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
839 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
840 if (context->names[i].name) {
841 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
842 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
844 audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
846 if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
847 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
848 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
849 context->names[i].ino,
850 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
851 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
852 context->names[i].mode,
853 context->names[i].uid,
854 context->names[i].gid,
855 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
856 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
861 /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
862 * __put_task_struct. */
863 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
865 struct audit_context *context;
868 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
871 if (likely(!context))
874 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
875 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
876 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
877 audit_log_exit(context);
879 audit_free_context(context);
882 /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
883 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
884 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
885 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
886 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
887 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
889 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
890 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
891 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
893 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
894 enum audit_state state;
898 /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
899 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
900 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
901 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
902 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
906 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
908 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
909 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
911 if (context->in_syscall) {
912 struct audit_context *newctx;
914 #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
915 /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
916 if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
921 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
922 " entering syscall=%d\n",
923 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
925 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
927 newctx->previous = context;
929 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
931 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
932 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
933 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
934 * to abandon auditing. */
935 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
938 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
943 context->arch = arch;
944 context->major = major;
945 context->argv[0] = a1;
946 context->argv[1] = a2;
947 context->argv[2] = a3;
948 context->argv[3] = a4;
950 state = context->state;
951 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
952 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
953 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
956 context->serial = audit_serial();
957 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
958 context->in_syscall = 1;
959 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
962 /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
963 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
964 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
965 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
966 * free the names stored from getname(). */
967 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
969 struct audit_context *context;
971 get_task_struct(tsk);
973 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
976 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
977 * called __put_task_struct. */
978 if (likely(!context))
981 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
982 audit_log_exit(context);
984 context->in_syscall = 0;
985 context->auditable = 0;
987 if (context->previous) {
988 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
989 context->previous = NULL;
990 audit_free_context(context);
991 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
993 audit_free_names(context);
994 audit_free_aux(context);
995 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
996 tsk->audit_context = context;
998 put_task_struct(tsk);
1001 /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
1002 void audit_getname(const char *name)
1004 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1006 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1009 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1010 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1011 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1012 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1017 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1018 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1019 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1020 ++context->name_count;
1021 if (!context->pwd) {
1022 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1023 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1024 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1025 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1030 /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
1031 * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
1032 * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
1034 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1036 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1039 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1040 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1041 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1042 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1043 if (context->name_count) {
1045 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1046 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1047 context->names[i].name,
1048 context->names[i].name);
1055 ++context->put_count;
1056 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1057 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1058 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1061 context->serial, context->major,
1062 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1063 context->put_count);
1070 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
1071 * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
1072 void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
1075 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1077 if (!context->in_syscall)
1079 if (context->name_count
1080 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1081 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1082 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1083 else if (context->name_count > 1
1084 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1085 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1086 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1088 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1089 * associated name? */
1090 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1092 idx = context->name_count++;
1093 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1095 ++context->ino_count;
1098 context->names[idx].flags = flags;
1099 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1100 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1101 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1102 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1103 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1104 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1107 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1108 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1110 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1111 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1112 *serial = ctx->serial;
1116 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1118 if (task->audit_context) {
1119 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1121 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1123 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1124 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1125 task->pid, task->uid,
1126 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1129 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1134 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1136 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1139 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1141 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1142 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1144 if (likely(!context))
1147 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1151 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1156 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1157 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1158 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1162 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1164 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1165 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1167 if (likely(!context))
1170 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1175 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1177 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1178 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1179 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1183 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1185 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1186 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1188 if (likely(!context))
1191 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1196 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1198 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1199 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1200 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1204 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1206 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1207 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1209 if (likely(!context))
1212 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1216 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1217 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1219 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1220 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1221 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1225 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1227 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1228 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1230 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) {
1231 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1232 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1233 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1235 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1237 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;