1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/selinux.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/inotify.h>
72 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
73 extern int audit_ever_enabled;
75 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
76 * for saving names from getname(). */
77 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
79 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
80 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
82 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
83 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
85 /* number of audit rules */
88 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
91 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
92 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
93 * pointers at syscall exit time).
95 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
98 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
99 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
109 struct audit_aux_data {
110 struct audit_aux_data *next;
114 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
116 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
117 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
119 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
120 struct audit_aux_data d;
126 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
127 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 unsigned int msg_prio;
131 struct timespec abs_timeout;
134 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
137 struct sigevent notification;
140 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
141 struct audit_aux_data d;
143 struct mq_attr mqstat;
146 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
147 struct audit_aux_data d;
149 unsigned long qbytes;
156 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
157 struct audit_aux_data d;
160 struct mm_struct *mm;
163 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
164 struct audit_aux_data d;
166 unsigned long args[0];
169 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
170 struct audit_aux_data d;
175 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
176 struct audit_aux_data d;
180 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
181 struct audit_aux_data d;
182 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
183 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
184 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
185 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
186 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
187 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
191 struct audit_tree_refs {
192 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
193 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
196 /* The per-task audit context. */
197 struct audit_context {
198 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
199 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
200 enum audit_state state;
201 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
202 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
203 int major; /* syscall number */
204 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
205 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
206 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
207 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
209 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
210 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
212 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
213 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
214 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
216 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
218 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
219 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
220 unsigned long personality;
226 unsigned int target_sessionid;
228 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
230 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
239 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
240 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
242 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
243 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
244 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
248 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
250 unsigned n = ctx->major;
251 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
253 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
254 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
256 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
257 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
259 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
260 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
263 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
264 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
265 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
267 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
268 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
270 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
271 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
275 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
277 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
278 case 4: /* socketcall */
279 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
281 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
288 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
289 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
290 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
291 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
292 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
293 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
294 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
297 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
298 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
300 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
301 int left = ctx->tree_count;
303 p->c[--left] = chunk;
304 ctx->tree_count = left;
313 ctx->tree_count = 30;
319 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
321 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
322 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
328 p->next = ctx->trees;
330 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
331 ctx->tree_count = 31;
336 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
337 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
339 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
340 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
343 /* we started with empty chain */
344 p = ctx->first_trees;
346 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
351 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
353 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
357 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
358 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
362 ctx->tree_count = count;
366 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
368 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
369 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
375 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
377 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
378 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
383 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
384 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
385 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
390 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
391 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
398 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
399 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
401 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
402 struct audit_krule *rule,
403 struct audit_context *ctx,
404 struct audit_names *name,
405 enum audit_state *state)
407 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
410 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
411 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
416 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
421 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
422 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
426 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
429 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
432 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
435 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
438 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
441 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
444 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
447 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
450 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
454 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
458 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
459 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
462 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
464 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
466 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
471 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
474 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
475 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
484 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
487 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
488 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
497 result = (name->ino == f->val);
499 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
500 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
508 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
509 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
510 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
514 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
519 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
521 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
522 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
523 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
526 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
527 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
528 match for now to avoid losing information that
529 may be wanted. An error message will also be
533 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
536 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
545 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
546 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
547 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
550 /* Find files that match */
552 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
553 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
556 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
557 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
566 /* Find ipc objects that match */
568 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
569 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
571 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
572 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
573 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
587 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
589 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
590 /* ignore this field for filtering */
594 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
602 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
603 switch (rule->action) {
604 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
605 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
610 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
611 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
612 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
614 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
616 struct audit_entry *e;
617 enum audit_state state;
620 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
621 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
627 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
630 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
631 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
632 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
633 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
635 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
636 struct audit_context *ctx,
637 struct list_head *list)
639 struct audit_entry *e;
640 enum audit_state state;
642 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
643 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
646 if (!list_empty(list)) {
647 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
648 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
650 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
651 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
652 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
660 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
663 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
664 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
665 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
666 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
668 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
669 struct audit_context *ctx)
672 struct audit_entry *e;
673 enum audit_state state;
675 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
676 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
679 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
680 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
681 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
682 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
683 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
684 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
686 if (list_empty(list))
689 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
690 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
691 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
698 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
701 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
706 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
710 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
712 if (likely(!context))
714 context->return_valid = return_valid;
717 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
718 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
721 * This is actually a test for:
722 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
723 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
725 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
727 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
728 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
729 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
730 context->return_code = -EINTR;
732 context->return_code = return_code;
734 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
735 enum audit_state state;
737 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
738 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
739 context->auditable = 1;
743 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
744 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
745 context->auditable = 1;
751 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
755 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
760 if (context->auditable
761 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
762 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
763 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
764 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
766 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
767 context->name_count, context->put_count,
769 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
770 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
771 context->names[i].name,
772 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
779 context->put_count = 0;
780 context->ino_count = 0;
783 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
784 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
785 __putname(context->names[i].name);
787 context->name_count = 0;
788 path_put(&context->pwd);
789 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
790 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
793 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
795 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
797 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
798 context->aux = aux->next;
801 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
802 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
807 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
808 enum audit_state state)
810 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
811 context->state = state;
814 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
816 struct audit_context *context;
818 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
820 audit_zero_context(context, state);
825 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
828 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
829 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
830 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
833 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
835 struct audit_context *context;
836 enum audit_state state;
838 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
839 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
841 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
842 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
845 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
846 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
850 tsk->audit_context = context;
851 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
855 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
857 struct audit_context *previous;
861 previous = context->previous;
862 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
864 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
865 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
866 context->serial, context->major,
867 context->name_count, count);
869 audit_free_names(context);
870 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
871 free_tree_refs(context);
872 audit_free_aux(context);
873 kfree(context->filterkey);
878 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
881 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
888 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
892 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
894 if (error != -EINVAL)
899 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
900 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
904 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
908 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
910 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
912 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
913 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
914 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
918 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
919 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
920 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
923 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
926 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
928 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
929 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
934 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
936 audit_log_task_context(ab);
939 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
940 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
943 struct audit_buffer *ab;
948 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
952 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
954 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
955 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
958 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
959 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
961 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
962 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
969 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
970 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
971 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
973 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
974 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
975 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
976 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
977 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
979 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
980 struct audit_buffer **ab,
983 const char __user *p,
986 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
987 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
988 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
989 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
990 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
991 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
992 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
995 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
996 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
999 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1000 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1001 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1004 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1006 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1010 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1012 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1013 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1016 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1018 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1019 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1024 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1027 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1028 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1031 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1032 * send half as much in each message
1034 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1037 len_left -= to_send;
1039 } while (len_left > 0);
1043 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1046 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1047 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1050 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1051 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1055 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1056 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1058 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1060 room_left -= to_send;
1061 if (room_left < 0) {
1064 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1070 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1071 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1073 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1074 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1075 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1078 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1079 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1080 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1082 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1083 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1088 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1091 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1093 /* actually log it */
1094 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1096 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1097 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1099 audit_log_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1101 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1102 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1105 len_left -= to_send;
1106 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1108 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1110 *len_sent += to_send;
1112 /* include the null we didn't log */
1116 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1117 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1118 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1121 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1122 const char __user *p;
1125 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1126 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1128 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1130 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1133 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1134 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1135 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1136 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1138 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1140 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1144 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1145 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1154 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1156 int i, call_panic = 0;
1157 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1158 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1161 /* tsk == current */
1162 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1164 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1165 context->uid = tsk->uid;
1166 context->gid = tsk->gid;
1167 context->euid = tsk->euid;
1168 context->suid = tsk->suid;
1169 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
1170 context->egid = tsk->egid;
1171 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
1172 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
1173 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1175 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1177 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1178 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1179 context->arch, context->major);
1180 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1181 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1182 if (context->return_valid)
1183 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1184 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1185 context->return_code);
1187 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1188 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
1189 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1190 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1193 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
1194 audit_log_format(ab,
1195 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1196 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1197 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1198 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1203 context->name_count,
1209 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1210 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1213 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1215 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1216 if (context->filterkey) {
1217 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1218 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1220 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1223 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1225 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1227 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1229 switch (aux->type) {
1230 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1231 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
1232 audit_log_format(ab,
1233 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1234 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1235 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
1236 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
1237 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
1240 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1241 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
1242 audit_log_format(ab,
1243 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1244 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1245 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
1246 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1249 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1250 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
1251 audit_log_format(ab,
1252 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1254 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
1257 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1258 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
1259 audit_log_format(ab,
1260 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1263 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
1264 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
1268 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1269 audit_log_format(ab,
1270 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1271 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1272 if (axi->osid != 0) {
1275 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1276 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1277 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
1281 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1282 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1287 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
1288 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1289 audit_log_format(ab,
1290 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1291 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1294 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1295 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1296 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1299 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1301 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
1302 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
1303 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
1304 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
1307 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
1308 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
1310 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1311 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
1314 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1315 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1316 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1323 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1324 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1327 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1328 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1329 axs->target_auid[i],
1331 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1333 axs->target_comm[i]))
1337 if (context->target_pid &&
1338 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1339 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1340 context->target_sessionid,
1341 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1344 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1345 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1347 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1351 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1352 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1354 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1356 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1358 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1361 switch(n->name_len) {
1362 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1363 /* log the full path */
1364 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1365 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1368 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1369 * directory component is the cwd */
1370 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1373 /* log the name's directory component */
1374 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1375 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
1379 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1381 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1382 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1383 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1384 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1397 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1398 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1399 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1402 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1403 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1410 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1411 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1415 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1419 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1420 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1422 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1424 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1426 struct audit_context *context;
1428 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1429 if (likely(!context))
1432 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1433 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1434 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1435 * in the context of the idle thread */
1436 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1437 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1438 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1440 audit_free_context(context);
1444 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1445 * @tsk: task being audited
1446 * @arch: architecture type
1447 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1448 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1449 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1450 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1451 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1453 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1454 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1455 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1456 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1457 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1458 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1461 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1462 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1463 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1465 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1466 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1467 enum audit_state state;
1472 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1473 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1474 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1475 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1476 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1480 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1482 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1483 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1485 if (context->in_syscall) {
1486 struct audit_context *newctx;
1490 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1491 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1492 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1494 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1496 newctx->previous = context;
1498 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1500 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1501 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1502 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1503 * to abandon auditing. */
1504 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1507 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1512 context->arch = arch;
1513 context->major = major;
1514 context->argv[0] = a1;
1515 context->argv[1] = a2;
1516 context->argv[2] = a3;
1517 context->argv[3] = a4;
1519 state = context->state;
1520 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1521 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1522 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1523 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1526 context->serial = 0;
1527 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1528 context->in_syscall = 1;
1529 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1534 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1535 * @tsk: task being audited
1536 * @valid: success/failure flag
1537 * @return_code: syscall return value
1539 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1540 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1541 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1542 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1543 * free the names stored from getname().
1545 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1547 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1548 struct audit_context *context;
1550 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1552 if (likely(!context))
1555 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1556 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1558 context->in_syscall = 0;
1559 context->auditable = 0;
1561 if (context->previous) {
1562 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1563 context->previous = NULL;
1564 audit_free_context(context);
1565 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1567 audit_free_names(context);
1568 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1569 audit_free_aux(context);
1570 context->aux = NULL;
1571 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1572 context->target_pid = 0;
1573 context->target_sid = 0;
1574 kfree(context->filterkey);
1575 context->filterkey = NULL;
1576 tsk->audit_context = context;
1580 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1582 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1583 struct audit_context *context;
1584 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1585 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1587 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1589 context = current->audit_context;
1591 count = context->tree_count;
1593 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1597 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1599 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1600 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
1601 audit_set_auditable(context);
1602 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1603 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1606 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1610 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1612 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1613 struct audit_context *context;
1614 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1615 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1616 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1620 context = current->audit_context;
1622 count = context->tree_count;
1627 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1629 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1630 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1631 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1632 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1634 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1640 parent = d->d_parent;
1645 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1648 /* just a race with rename */
1649 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1652 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1653 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1654 /* OK, got more space */
1655 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1660 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
1661 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1662 audit_set_auditable(context);
1670 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1671 * @name: name to add
1673 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1674 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1676 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1678 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1680 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1683 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1684 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1685 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1686 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1691 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1692 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1693 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1694 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1695 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1696 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1697 ++context->name_count;
1698 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1699 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1700 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1701 path_get(¤t->fs->pwd);
1702 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1707 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1708 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1710 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1711 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1712 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1714 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1716 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1719 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1720 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1721 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1722 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1723 if (context->name_count) {
1725 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1726 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1727 context->names[i].name,
1728 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1735 ++context->put_count;
1736 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1737 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1738 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1741 context->serial, context->major,
1742 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1743 context->put_count);
1750 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1751 const struct inode *inode)
1753 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1755 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1756 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
1757 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1758 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1762 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data");
1765 context->name_count++;
1767 context->ino_count++;
1772 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1773 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1775 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1776 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1777 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1778 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1779 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1780 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1781 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1785 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1786 * @name: name being audited
1787 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1789 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1791 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1794 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1795 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1797 if (!context->in_syscall)
1799 if (context->name_count
1800 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1801 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1802 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1803 else if (context->name_count > 1
1804 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1805 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1806 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1808 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1809 * associated name? */
1810 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1812 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1813 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1815 handle_path(dentry);
1816 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1820 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1821 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1822 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1823 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1825 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1826 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1827 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1828 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1829 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1830 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1831 * unsuccessful attempts.
1833 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
1834 const struct inode *parent)
1837 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1838 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1839 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1842 if (!context->in_syscall)
1847 /* determine matching parent */
1851 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
1852 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1853 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1858 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1859 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1860 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
1861 found_parent = n->name;
1866 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
1867 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1868 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1873 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
1874 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
1875 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1877 audit_copy_inode(n, inode);
1879 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1880 found_child = n->name;
1886 if (!found_parent) {
1887 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
1889 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1890 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1891 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1895 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1897 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1899 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1900 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1901 * audit_free_names() */
1903 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
1904 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1905 /* don't call __putname() */
1906 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
1908 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1912 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1914 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1917 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1920 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1921 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1922 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1923 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1925 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1927 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1928 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1931 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1932 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1933 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1934 *serial = ctx->serial;
1938 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1939 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1942 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1943 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1944 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1948 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1950 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1952 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
1953 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1955 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
1956 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1958 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1960 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1961 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
1962 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
1963 task->pid, task->uid,
1964 task->loginuid, loginuid,
1965 task->sessionid, sessionid);
1969 task->sessionid = sessionid;
1970 task->loginuid = loginuid;
1975 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1978 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1980 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1982 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
1984 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
1985 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1990 if (likely(!context))
1993 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1997 if (u_attr != NULL) {
1998 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
2003 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
2008 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2009 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2010 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2015 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
2016 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2017 * @msg_len: Message length
2018 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2019 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2021 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2023 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2024 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2026 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2027 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2032 if (likely(!context))
2035 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2039 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2040 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2045 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2048 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2049 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
2051 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2052 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2053 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2058 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
2059 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2060 * @msg_len: Message length
2061 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
2062 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2064 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2066 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
2067 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
2068 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2070 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2071 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2076 if (likely(!context))
2079 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2083 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
2084 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
2091 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2092 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2097 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2100 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2102 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2103 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2104 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2109 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2110 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2111 * @u_notification: Notification event
2113 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2116 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
2118 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
2119 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2124 if (likely(!context))
2127 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2131 if (u_notification != NULL) {
2132 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
2137 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
2141 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2142 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2143 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2148 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2149 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2152 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2154 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2156 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
2157 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2162 if (likely(!context))
2165 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2170 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
2172 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2173 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2174 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2179 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2180 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2182 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2184 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2186 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2187 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2189 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2193 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
2194 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
2195 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
2196 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
2197 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
2198 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2199 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2204 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2205 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2206 * @uid: msgq user id
2207 * @gid: msgq group id
2208 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2210 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2212 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2214 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2215 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2217 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2221 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
2226 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
2227 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2228 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2232 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2234 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2235 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2237 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2240 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2244 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2245 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2247 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2248 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2249 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2255 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2256 * @nargs: number of args
2259 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2261 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2263 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
2264 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2266 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2269 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
2274 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2276 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2277 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2278 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2283 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2284 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2285 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2287 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2289 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2291 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2292 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
2294 if (likely(!context)) {
2298 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2306 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
2307 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2308 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2313 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2314 * @len: data length in user space
2315 * @a: data address in kernel space
2317 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2319 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2321 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
2322 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2324 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2327 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
2332 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
2334 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
2335 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2336 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2340 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2342 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2344 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2345 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2346 context->target_uid = t->uid;
2347 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2348 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2349 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2353 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2354 * @sig: signal value
2355 * @t: task being signaled
2357 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2358 * and uid that is doing that.
2360 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2362 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2363 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2364 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2365 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
2366 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
2367 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
2369 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2370 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
2371 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2372 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2373 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2375 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
2376 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2378 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2382 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2383 * in audit_context */
2384 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2385 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2386 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2387 ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
2388 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2389 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2390 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2394 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2395 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2396 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2400 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2401 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2402 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2404 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2406 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2407 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2408 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
2409 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2410 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2411 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2418 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2419 * @signr: signal value
2421 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2422 * should record the event for investigation.
2424 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2426 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2428 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2429 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2434 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2437 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2438 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2439 auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
2440 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2445 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2446 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2448 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2449 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2452 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2453 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2454 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);